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The U.S. Navy is different from the other armed forces in its communications
requirements. Due to the lack of terrestrial connectivity possessed by other services, the
Navy has become highly reliant on SATCOM for all forms of communication. This thesis
presents a requirements analysis of a proposed MTLSATCOM architecture. The architecture,
when fielded, will form the backbone for all U.S. military satellite communications. It is
expected to be operational in the year 2008. The purpose of the study is to determine if the
proposed architecture meets Naval communications requirements as defined in the Emerging
Requirements Data Base (ERDB). In keeping with the stated purpose, only Naval
requirements were loaded for the analysis. Requirements from other services and government
agencies were not considered for this study.
As we enter the Information Age, communications connectivity and capacity will
equate to operational effectiveness for Naval forces. This thesis identifies requirements
shortfalls in the proposed architecture. It specifies the frequency bands where deficiencies are
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The United States maintains a fleet of communications satellites which have proved
to be the backbone of U.S. military communications for the past several decades. This
architecture has been sufficient to support recent military operations, but lacks the capabilities
required to carry out the information intensive operations expected in the near future. The
U.S. is currently developing plans to replace its aging inventory of communications satellites
with a new, more robust, satellite communications architecture. This architecture is expected
to meet the communications requirements of the Armed Forces, as well as other national
agencies, as we enter the information age.
The constellation of satellites proposed by the Department ofDefense Office of the
Space Architect is a fully integrated communications architecture. It is designed to leverage
the capabilities of each individual system. The architecture is optimized for support ofjoint
operations. It will provide different levels of service, robustness and survivability throughout
the Joint Command hierarchy. Each system has its own strengths and weaknesses, each of
which plays a specific role in the architecture. This integrated communication system will
provide a large percentage of the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (C4I) capabilities defined as requirements by the individual services. [Ref. l:p. 15]
The Navy is unique from the other armed forces in its communications requirements.
Naval units are inherently mobile and, therefore, lack the traditional connectivity possessed
by their counterparts. Due to the lack of terrestrial connectivity, the Navy has become highly
reliant on satellite communications (SATCOM) for all forms of communications. The
increased use of satellite assets enhances U.S. Naval mission effectiveness. It is therefore
highly important that the architecture which is to be implemented meet all Naval
requirements.
The purpose of the thesis research presented in this document is to perform an
independent evaluation ofthe performance of the proposed MILSATCOM architecture with
respect to Naval requirements. As discussed in the above section, the implications of this
architecture will have far reaching effects on the structure and operational effectiveness of the
Navy in the 21 st century.
1. Importance ofMILSATCOM
MILSATCOM, with its world wide coverage and large bandwidth capability, is
indispensable in today's Navy. It provides reliable and secure communications and data
services to deployed units. There is no other form ofcommunication which can take the place
of satellite communications. SATCOM allows commanders at sea to maintain continual
contact with their chains of command. Continual contact is becoming more important as
certain parts ofthe globe become less stable.
2. Long Term Impact of the Architecture
The proposed MILSATCOM architecture, ifimplemented, will have an impact on the
armed forces of the United States for years to come. At an expected cost of 65 billion
dollars, this integrated communications system will take years to develop and acquire. It is
expected to be in place by the year 2008. Once in place, this system will be required to fulfill
the SATCOM requirements both the Department of Defense and other national agencies. It
is imperative that the system have the capacity to handle the communications needs of the
future. If the system is unable to handle today's data requirements, or those in the near
future, it has little prospect of being an effective system in the year 2020.
3. Factors which Impact the Architecture
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Figure 1.1. Example ofExponential Growth ofBandwidth Requirements.
There are many factors which impact the future of this architecture. The first and
foremost of these is the cost. The current trend of budget cuts and shrinking defense
spending does not bode well for the system. Recent arguments in Congress indicate that
many feel there is little or no need for this system. Some propose contracting civilian
companies to provide all future MDLSATCOM. Another issue which impacts the architecture
is how to predict what the data requirements will be in the future. Figure 1 . 1 illustrates the
projected growth of data rate requirements in the near future. A distinct exponential curve
is evident in the figure. This figure was created by establishing current bandwidth
requirements [Ref. 2:p. 5-18] and comparing them with anticipated requirements specified in
the Emerging Requirements Data Base. Currently, these requirements appear to be growing
at an exponential rate but there is no guarantee that this trend will continue. This growth has
a strong impact on the cost of the system, since cost is directly related to bandwidth. If the
data requirements ofthe future are overestimated, then the system cost will be unacceptable.
If, on the other hand, future data requirements are underestimated, then the system will lose
its effectiveness and will be a waste oftax-payer dollars. There are many other factors which
might affect the outcome of the architecture, but cost and projected bandwidth capacity
appear to be the most significant.
B. SCOPE
This document is intended to provide a broad overview of the MELSATCOM
architecture and its performance. Due to the size and complexity of the project, it is
impossible to delve deeply into all aspects of the system. This thesis research has centered
on satisfaction of Naval requirements. Constraints are defined below which frame the
problem to be analyzed.
1. General Research Questions
The intent of this research is to answer certain questions with regard to
MELSATCOM. The thesis effort has been directed toward answering the following questions
and analyzing the results:
a. Question One
Does the MTLSATCOM architecture meet Naval communications
requirements as defined in the Integrated Communications Database (ICDB) and the
Emerging Requirements Database (ERDB)?
b. Question Two
What are the specific areas noted as shortfalls ifthe architecture does not meet
the requirements?
c Question Three
Once shortfalls have been noted, what can be done to fulfill them? This
research has considered both proven and emerging technologies which have the potential to
provide augmentation for systems with shortfalls. This section will identify specific system
alternatives and provide the shortfalls which they are intended to address.
2. Limitations of Study
Specific limitations ofthe study must be clearly defined in order to properly frame the
investigation. The analysis distinguishes among the roles of the terminal segment, budget,
force structure and dependency/interoperability with commercial satellite systems.
a. Terminal Segment
The terminal segment of any SATCOM system plays a key role in the
architecture. The terminal segment determines how 'user-friendly' the system will be to its
operators. It can be as small as a hand held cellular phone or as large as a fixed military
communications station. The size of the terminal is determined by the mission to be
performed and the frequency band in which it will operate.
Terminals are also important in terms of budget. In previous SATCOM
systems the terminal segment has accounted for up to one half ofthe system lifecycle cost.
Terminals also take many years to fully integrate into the fleet. Integration is a complex
exercise which involves training users throughout the fleet, removing older system terminals
and installing the new terminals. This entire process takes years and generally lags behind the
deployment of the space segment. While terminals account for a large percentage of the
budget and take years to implement, they will be held as a constant in this analysis. The
assumption will be made that the terminals have been acquired and installed. The purpose of
the analysis is to examine the performance of the space segment. Further research into
terminal architecture and interoperability with existing systems could form the basis for a
future in-depth research project. [Ref 3:p. 1-3]
b. Budget
Budget plays a vital role in the system architecture. The budget, more than
any other factor, determines system capabilities, numbers of spacecraft produced and design
life of the satellites. The proposed budget for the MILSATCOM architecture is
approximately 65 billion dollars. This cost will be spread over several years, but it is still a
significant percentage ofthe defense appropriations budget as a whole. There is no guarantee
that the full cost for the architecture will be appropriated by congress. This uncertainty casts
some doubt as to what the final architecture make-up might be. For purposes of this analysis,
the assumption was made that Congress has appropriated the 65 billion dollars required to
develop and deploy the architecture proposed by the DoD Space Architect.
c. Force Structurefor Analysis
Force structure plays a vital role in a loading analysis for an architecture. A
loading analysis is a computer simulation designed to approximate the communication
capabilities required for a certain number of forces in a specific scenario. For purposes of the
loading analysis performed on the proposed architecture, current naval force structure was
used. Ten Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) and ten Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) were
entered into the loading as the naval forces. These forces were deployed both at home and
abroad. Each CVBG was comprised of one carrier, two cruisers, three destroyers, three
frigates, three fast attack submarines and one replenishment ship. Each ARG was comprised
of one large deck amphibious assault ship, one LPD, one LSD, two destroyers, one frigate.
Both the CVBGs and ARGs also included their associated air wings and staffs. This force
structure will probably be untenable by the time the proposed architecture is in place due to
the rate of ship decommissionings compared to new construction efforts. It does, however,
provide a good baseline to determine the total capacity of the system. This capacity can then
be compared to anticipated requirements found in the ICDB and the ERDB.
d. Dependence/Interoperability with Commercial Satellites
The Navy currently employs commercial satellites (COMMERSAT) to fulfill
requirements which are not being met by today's MILSATCOM system. There is no reason
to suspect that this practice will not be carried out in the future. In some instances,
COMMERSAT provides effective, cost efficient communications where none existed before.
This allows the Navy to leverage commercial systems in order to provide service for which
there is no military capability available. This type of service is extremely valuable in providing
surge capacity. The military, in all likelihood, will become more dependent on this form of
communication in the case of regional crisis. In the future, military terminals and systems will
likely become more interoperable with commercial systems to facilitate communications.
For the purposes of this analysis, COMMERSAT capabilities associated with
DoD system augmentation were omitted. The analysis examines the capabilities of the
MILSATCOM system alone. The communications loadings were made independent of
commercial system capabilities. The requirement was to establish the limitations of the
architecture without augmentation. This allowed identification of specific areas ofweakness
in the architecture. Once these areas were identified, analysis was performed to identify the
most cost effective means of fulfilling the shortfalls. In some instances a space based system
might not be the most efficient means of communications.
C. METHODOLOGY
This thesis was created by researching current MILSATCOM systems, analyzing the
loading analysis, and investigating current and emerging communications technologies.
1. Data Collection Technique
Data Collection was done by gathering information from numerous publications and
databases. This was used in addition to the architecture loading analysis performed by Booz-
Allen & Hamilton Inc., for Naval Space Command. Once the analysis was complete, it was
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compiled into Federal Systems Integration and Management Center (FEDSEM) document
85072NAD-09 [Ref. 4]. The combination of published material and raw loading data formed
the basis for this thesis.
2. Data Analysis Technique
Data analysis was completed by studying the results of the system loading performed
on the 2008 MILSATCOM architecture. Areas ofweakness were noted and then analyzed
so as to provide possible alternatives to alleviate the bandwidth shortfalls. Current systems
and those under development were examined for their possible value.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter I provides the reader an understanding ofthe purpose and scope of the thesis.
It describes the methodology used for the data collection and analysis of the material used in
the study. It then goes on to provide a large background section. The intention for chapter
one is to provide a reader, who might not have a space systems related background, the
information necessary to fully comprehend the analysis in the body of the thesis.
Chapter II provides the implications ofthe current MILSATCOM system on the fleet.
By understanding the impact of the current system, it is easier to assess the value provided
by its successor. This chapter discusses naval force deployment and the organization of the
units. It also describes the individual systems in the current MILSATCOM system. Then it
discusses some of the operational and quality-of-life implications brought about by improved
SATCOM capabilities.
Chapter III provides insight into envisioned MILSATCOM requirements. It begins
by reviewing both the ICDB and the ERDB and their contents. Then it discusses Naval
SATCOM functional requirements and some of the challenges for the future. This chapter
concludes by examining some of the vulnerability issues which face SATCOM today.
Chapter IV describes the system loading methodology. It begins by listing the
assumptions made in the generation of the scenario. It also addresses the force structure
used to generate the SATCOM traffic. Once the background has been laid, it then outlines
the loading scenario build-up. Beginning in a peace-time situation, the program escalates
military activity to the point ofone Major Regional Conflict (MRC) and four Lesser Regional
Conflicts (LRCs). Loading analysis data is gathered at specific intervals during the build-up.
Chapter V is an analysis ofthe loading results. This is where specific shortfalls in the
architecture are discussed. Tools used to conduct the loading are identified. The analysis
examines shortfalls at each of the steps in the scenario build-up. This leads directly into
chapter six. Chapter VI consists of conclusions and recommendations from this study.
E. BACKGROUND
Before beginning an analysis of the architecture as a whole, it is important to define
certain terminology as it applies to satellite communications. Familiarity with the components
that make up a communications system and how they interact is required. It also is necessary
to understand the laws of physics which govern satellite operations. The remainder of this
chapter is dedicated to building the baseline knowledge necessary to fully comprehend the
analysis. The intent in this background section is to develop a pool of information which




For the purpose ofthis analysis it is necessary to build certain working definitions of
terminology which directly relate to the subject at hand.
a. Space Segment
The space segment consists of the satellite or spacecraft with its various
support and payload subsystems. The terms satellite and spacecraft are often used
interchangeably, but the term spacecraft is more frequently seen in military documents. In the
case of a MILSATCOM system, the payload is generally the communications subsystem.
[Ref 5:p. 3-1]
b. Control Segment
The control segment consists of three major operations. Control of the
spacecraft is one ofthese. Spacecraft control is the process by which operators monitor and
maintain vehicle attitude control, station keeping, maneuvering and ephemeris data
generation. A broad term used to describe the majority ofthese tasks is Telemetry, Tracking
and Control (TT&C). The second operation is payload control which consists of antenna
pointing and transponder adjustments. It is concerned with the monitoring, upkeep and
employment ofthe payload. The Network control operation is concerned with the spectrum
management of the frequencies assigned to the system.
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c. Terminal Segment
The terminal segment is a reference to the complex of terrestrial (land-, sea-,
or air-based) user hardware, software, and connectivity for accessing communications over
the space segment. It is sometimes called the earth terminal segment or the terrestrial
segment. [Ref. 5:p. 3-2]
d\ Wideband
Wideband data rates are considered to be greater than 64 kbps. Wideband
services are used to support medium and high capacity SATCOM requirements.
e. Narrowband
Narrowband data rates are defined as equal to or less than 64 kbps. These
services are used to support low capacity SATCOM requirements.
/ Mobile
Mobile SATCOM is defined differently by each service. The Army and Air
Force designate a system as mobile if it can be air lifted into an area, set up and then operated
as designed. This definition is inadequate for Naval applications. For Naval purposes, a
mobile system will be defined as a system which can be operated onboard a ship while
conducting normal operations.
g. Terminals
Terminals are a combination of hardware and software which allow access to




Networks consist of a complex of common hardware and software through
which data is transmitted. A network can be classified as either one oftwo topologies. The
first ofthese topologies to be considered is point-to-point communication. A point-to-point
network is analogous to a telephone system in which there is one caller and one receiver. The
second topology is the netted network or netted circuit. On a netted network, many entities
have access to the medium and wait for the appropriate moment to enter the net. Netted
networks make up the majority of the military's communications networks. They work to
decrease required bandwidth and ensure all units maintain full situational awareness. Point-
to-point networks require more bandwidth to carry the same amount of traffic as the netted
circuits. Their utility is in the privacy inherent to this form of communications.
L Low Data Rate (LDR)
Some communications documents speak in terms of data rates rather than wide
and narrow band. Data rates identify the specific baud rate realized by an operational system.
Low Data Rate is defined as any transmission which is less than or equal to 9.6 Kbps.
j. Medium Data Rate (MDR)
Medium Data Rate is defined as any transmission greater than 9.6 Kbps, up
to and including 1.544 Mbps.
13
k. High Data Rate (HDR)
High Data Rate is defined as any transmission over 1.544 Mbps.
I Worldwide Coverage
Worldwide coverage, for the purposes of this analysis, is coverage around the
circumference of the Earth (360 degrees longitude) and to 70 degrees North or South
latitude.
m. Global Coverage
Global coverage is coverage ofthe entire globe. It is different from worldwide
coverage in that global coverage includes the polar regions.
2. General Orbital Mechanics
Satellites are bodies which orbit the Earth. Their motion is a result of the gravitational
pull of the Earth's mass. A satellite's orbit can differ depending upon a number of
parameters. The first is the altitude of the orbit. The lower a satellite is
,
the faster it will
travel around the Earth. A satellite which is at an altitude of two hundred kilometers will
complete one orbit in approximately ninety minutes. A satellite which is in geosynchronous
orbit (42,164 km) will complete one orbit every 24 hours. Other parameters such as
eccentricity and inclination will affect a satellite's period and the coverage it provides. Figure
1.2 provides an illustration of the general orbital regimes used by spacecraft.
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Figure 1.2. An illustration of general orbits. [Ref. 6:p. 6]
The following are definitions of general orbital regimes:
a. Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
A satellite in Low Earth Orbit will have an apogee of no greater than 1,000
km. The Van-Allen radiation belts begin at approximately 1,000 km and are used as the
defining point for the upper limit ofLEO orbits. LEO satellites travel extremely fast due to
their low altitudes. A satellite in a 500 km LEO orbit travels at 7.6 kilometers per second.
In comparison, a GEO spacecraft with an altitude of 35786 km travels at 3. 1 kilometers per
second. Because of their low altitudes, LEO spacecraft experience greater atmospheric drag
forces than MEO or GEO satellites. Due to the drag effects on the spacecraft, greater
amounts offuel must be expended to maintain their proper operational orbits. This translates
directly into a short life, generally 2 or 3 years.
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b. Medium Earth Orbit (MEO)
Medium Earth Orbits are above the LEO upper limit, but lower than a
geosynchronous orbit. "Mid-range altitudes may have coverage characteristics which make
them particularly valuable for some missions. A disadvantage is the weight of the necessary
radiation shielding or else reduced life, due to this region's increased radiation environment."
[Ref. 7:p. 179]
c. Highly Elliptic Orbit (HEO)
Spacecraft in highly elliptic, or oval shaped, orbits traverse through both the
LEO and MEO orbital regimes including the Van-Allen belts. The most common HEO orbit
is known as a Molniya. A Molniya orientation with the proper perigee can provide coverage
at higher latitudes. The former Soviet Union used such an orbit for communications satellites
for many years. [Ref 7:p. 180] This form of orbit can provide extended coverage in the
northern latitudes including the polar region. This is important to the Navy because the
current inventory ofU.S. communications satellites lacks polar coverage.
d. Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)
In a geosynchronous orbit, a satellite's motion is synchronized with an area
ofthe Earth below it and centered on the equator. A satellite in this orbit will complete one
revolution every 24 hours. This provides reduced tracking costs and easier orbital
maintenance. At a distance of 6.6 earth radii from the earth's center, a GEO satellite has an
altitude of 39,785 km above the earth's surface. A GEO satellite can be placed in any
inclination. A GEO orbit is said to be inclined when the plane of the satellite's orbit is at an
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angle to the plane of the Earth's equator. When the orbit is in the equatorial plane, the GEO
is said to be geostationary, since it appears stationary with respect to an observer on the earth.
For inclinations other than zero degrees, a geosynchronous satellite's motion and ground
track will appear as a figure eight with its apex located over the equator.
3. Orbits of Existing U.S. Communications Satellites
Currently the United States maintains three regimes of satellites for military
communications. All of these satellites operate in geostationary or low-inclination GEO
orbits. In the past GEO has been deemed the most efficient orbit for communications
purposes. It has reduced tracking and station keeping costs as its primary benefit. A lack of
coverage above seventy degrees latitude is the one major constraint of the current system.
The Navy has a requirement for polar coverage which is not being met with the existing
MILSATCOM systems.
4. Current MILSATCOM System Applications
The current MILSATCOM architecture consists of numerous systems which are
divided into categories based upon the frequency band in which they operate. The
frequencies most often used are Ultra-High Frequency (UHF), Super-High Frequency (SHF),
and Extremely-High Frequency (EHF). There are different models of satellites which are
tuned to operate in one or more of the above frequency bands. The unique attributes of each
system lend themselves to specific missions or forms of communications. It is for this reason
that each of the satellite systems has specific applications with which it is associated.
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a. UHF Applications
UHF satellites have been the workhorse ofNaval tactical communications for
years. It provides LDR and MDR services to both surface and airborne platforms. It is used
to provide Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) communications to lower echelon commands,
aircraft, and ground forces ashore. [Ref. 8:p. 10]
b. SHF Applications
SHF satellites have generally provided wideband services to higher echelon
command and fixed ground stations. SHF transmission is generally associated with national
level defense communications. It is currently aboard larger surface platforms such as aircraft
carriers and large deck amphibious assault ships. It is used for applications which require a
higher data rate than UHF can provide. Due to the larger bandwidth and higher antenna gain,
Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) satellites can transmit imagery in a fraction
of the time required by a UHF spacecraft. [Ref. 8:p. 11]
c. EHF Applications
Extremely High Frequency bandwidth provides virtually unjammable,
undetectable, secure, nuclear survivable communications for strategic and tactical users. [Ref.
8:p. 13] The Navy is beginning to make use ofthe EHF frequency band. In the past, the Air
Force has been the primary user of this technology. As more EHF systems are deployed, (via
the UFO, a.k.a. UHF Follow-on, program and MELSTAR) the Navy is finding utility for this
unique form of communication.
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5. General Overview of Space Policy
All objects placed into orbit are subject to international space law and various pacts
between the United States and other nations. It is for this reason important to examine
international space law and other agreements to which the U.S. is a party, with regard to
MTLSATCOM.
a. InternationalLaw
International law, including space law evolves in part from treaties, including
the United Nations Charter and resolutions plus organic documents of international
organizations. Sovereign nations may enter into treaties and support them as long as it suits
their security needs. When the treaty is no longer in that nation's best interest, they might
absolve themselves of any regulations held within the document. There is no overarching
court system which has absolute authority over international space issues. The International
Court of the Hague is named by the United Nations to hear international legal disputes but
all parties involved must agree to have the court hear the case. [Ref. 7:p. 742]
There are, at times, cases in which there are conflicts between U.S. statutory
law and international space treaties. There had to be some decision made as to which
statutes to follow in this situation. Current U.S. policy is that the most recent of the two
documents would be the one to be followed. If a treaty, which has just been signed, violates
a statues ofU.S. law, and the law has been on the books for a number of years, then industry
will use the statutes held within the treaty for guidance.
The current document used to define the principles of the U.S. space policy
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is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. This document lays down the basic philosophy and legal
principles for outer space. The major tenets of the document are described below.
(1) All nations may explore space for scientific purposes. International
cooperation is encouraged.
(2) No nation can claim objects in space or celestial bodies as the
sovereign property of one nation. Space belongs to all persons.
(3) The rules in space will follow the established principles and
rules of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
(4) No nation will place nuclear weapons or any other weapons of
mass destruction in orbit around the Earth, or on the Moon, or on other celestial bodies.
(5) Nations must use the Moon and other celestial bodies
exclusively for 'peaceful purposes,' but they may involve military personnel in scientific
research.
(6) Astronauts are envoys of mankind. So long as they conform
to accepted rule of activity in space, they have a form of immunity. Therefore, we must
return them to their home nation promptly, and implicitly, may not charge to rescue them.
(7) Recovered space objects must go back to the launching nation
at its request and expense.
(8) Nations bear international responsibility for their activities in
outer space, whether done by governmental agencies or private citizens. Thus, the United
States must authorize and continuously supervise all space activities of its citizens.
(9) Launching nations are liable for damages to citizens of other
nations caused by national and private launch facilities.
(10) Nations must maintain a register of their launches.
(11) Nations must conduct space activities so as to avoid harming
or contaminating the environment. [Ref 7:p. 743]
The United States attempts to gain maximum efficiency from its space based
assets while following the guidelines ofthe international space policy. With this in mind, it
is also important to remember that the U.S. allocates some of its satellite bandwidth to its
allies during exercises or multi-national operations. This is done in a spirit of cooperation
with our allies. The result of allocating a portion of the architectures bandwidth is less
bandwidth available for American units to use.
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b. National Space Policy
Our national space policy is defined by the President. It outlines the guiding
principles for the national space program. This policy is created with a balance between
national objectives and our national treaty commitments.
The Clinton Administration Space Policy. The Clinton Administration has
expressed a great deal of interest in the National Space Program. The President has been a
strong proponent ofthe International Space Station and the further exploration ofMars in the
search for life. The Administration is aware that the scientific and technological base of the
country are a large driving force in the national economy. By investing in the space program,
the government can ensure the continued growth of the science and technology sector. [Ref.
9]
c. Naval Space Policy
Naval space policy is based upon the continued use ofthe UHF, SHF and EHF
spectrum to continue to provide secure, reliable communications to fleet units around the
world. SATCOM will be used to provide links to interface with various communications
systems and networks both ashore and afloat. The primary focus will be toward joint
interoperability.
6. General Overview of the Space Community
The U.S. military space program is comprised of numerous commands and agencies
from each service and other DoD agencies. Each command has a specific function to perform
in the space hierarchy. The below described entities are the primary commands both in, and
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associated with, the Naval space effort.
a. DoD Space Architect
The DoD Office of the Space Architect was created in 1995 to act as a
coordination center for the different military space programs. The Space Architect reports
through the Air Force Acquisition Executive to the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) on
matters of space system and architecture development and acquisition. Information
transitions up the chain ofcommand to the Office ofthe Deputy Under Secretary ofDefense
(DUSD) (Space). DUSD (Space) then provides the Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense (OSD)
with policy guidance for the development of space architectures which are consistent with
National Security and National Military Strategies. [Ref. 10]
The Space Architect defines their purpose as:
The purpose of the DoD Space Architect organization is to consolidate the
responsibilities for DoD space missions and system architecture development into a single
organization that shall integrate space architectures and systems, eliminate unnecessary
vertical stove-piping of programs, achieve efficiencies in acquisition and future operations
through program integration and thereby improve space support to military operations.
[Ref. 10]
b. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM)
"The mission ofUSSPACECOM is to conduct joint operations in accordance
with Unified Command Plan assigned missions: Space forces support, space force
enhancement, space force applications and space force control." [Ref. 11] Space force
support operations include the launch and control of satellites by the responsible service space
command. Space force enhancement is characterized by employing space based assets to
22
provide support to deployed forces. "To meet this need, USSPACECOM has control of a
fleet of satellites that provide ballistic missile warning, communications, weather and
navigation, and positioning support." [Ref. 11] Space force application is directly related to
ballistic missile defense and using on-orbit assets to offer limited protection against ballistic
missile attacks. Space force control is analogous to sea control in that USSPACECOM wants
to ensure access to space for U.S. and allied forces while denying it to any adversary.
a Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM)
NAVSPACECOM is chartered to provide essential information needs and
communications capabilities to Naval forces. To accomplish this task, NAVSPACECOM
executes those missions assigned by U.S. Commander-in-Chief Space (USCINCSPACE).
Naval Space Command has been assigned as the operational manager for Navy space based
communications systems. These systems include the FLTSAT, LEASAT and UFO F/O
satellite systems. They also act as an advocate in the Joint arena for Naval war fighting
requirements. In addition to these missions, NAVSPACECOM advises and supports Naval
units through training and the deployment of Space Support Teams to advise fleet units of
space based capabilities and assets. [Ref. 12]
d Air Force Space Command (AFSPQ
"The mission ofthe Air Force Space Command is to defend the United States
of America through the control and exploitation of space." [Ref. 13] AFSPC accomplishes
this objective mission statement by dividing the mission into four categories. These categories
are similar to those ofUSSPACECOM: Space force support, space force control, space force
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enhancement and space force application. The Air Force space hierarchy is responsible for
the launch of all military satellites and controls the majority ofU.S. satellites in execution of
their space support mission. AFSPC, in cooperation with NAVSPACECOM, continually
monitor all detectable objects in Earth orbit to support the space control mission. They also
employ space assets in such mission areas as navigation, communications and ballistic missile
warning to act as a force enhancement tool. AFSPC maintains a large force of over 530
intercontinental ballistic missiles which are on-alert continuously. This wing of the Air Force
acts as the space force application mission. This division of mission areas makes space more
reliable for the warfighter, and enhances the Air Forces ability to manage its space based
assets. [Ref 13]
e. Army Space Command (USARSPACE)
The Army Space Command provides support to the warfighter by maintaining
and controlling numerous space based systems. These systems include, but are not limited
to, the Army Ballistic Missile Defense/Anti-Satellite (BMD/ASAT), and DSCS Operations
Centers. USARSPACE is also a proponent of several developmental programs which are
designed to enhance warfighting capabilities through the use ofthe space environment.
[Ref. 14]
/ Space andNaval Warfare Systems Command (SPA WAR)
"The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command designs, acquires and
supports systems which collect, coordinate, process, analyze and present complex information
to the nation's leaders." [Ref. 15] SPAWAR is responsible for translating the needs ofthe
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operational commanders into requirements for space system design.
g. Naval Education and Training Center (NETC)
The Naval Education and Training Center is responsible for the training of
sailors throughout the fleet. It is the NETC which provides the training for space systems
technicians and operators. They monitor billet manning levels and conduct the required
training to ensure the Navy maintains the proper number of specialty coded personnel.
h. Theater Commander in Chiefs (CINCs)
Theater Commander-in-Chiefs are identified as the primary warfighters.
CINCs are, therefore, the individuals who identify needed operational capabilities. These
capabilities are translated into a Mission Need Statement (MNS) which is then used to define
the requirements for a new system or systems. It is in this manner that the CINC is able to
directly shape the future ofthe nation's military space based efforts.
7. Overview of Proposed Architecture
The proposed architecture is similar in some respects to the current MILSATCOM
system. It will still be divided into groupings for each class of satellite. These satellites will
be developed to operate in the primary military frequency bands: UHF, SHF and EHF. There
is one major difference in the fact that the proposed architecture will have broadcast satellites
which will function in the same manner as the GBS package on the last three UHF F/O. The
following is a breakdown ofthe proposed architecture in an operational configuration. It will
not take on-orbit spares into consideration.
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cl UHF F/O Constellation
The operational UHF F/O constellation will consist of eight satellites. The
assets will be placed over major areas of interest in groups of two. The proposed stationing
would place two satellites, each in a geosynchronous orbit, over each of the following
locations: The continental United States, Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.
This configuration will give worldwide coverage up to plus or minus seventy degrees. Each
satellite will have the following resources: one broadcast channel, seventeen 25 kHz channels
and twenty one 5 kHz channels.
b. SHF Constellation
The SHF constellation will consist of five satellites. Each ofthe satellites will
be placed in geosynchronous orbit and they will be spread evenly around the Earth's equator.
Each ofthe satellites will be equipped with four spot beams and the constellation will provide
world wide coverage. The SHF frequency band is from 7.9 to 8.4 GHZ. The system is able
to provide both medium and high data rate transmissions in this frequency band.
c. GBS Constellation
The GBS transponders will be placed on each of the five SHF satellites. The
services provided will be very similar to those provided by the UHF F/O GBS transponders.
By placing the GBS package on the SHF satellites, the DoD is able to ensure worldwide
coverage and reduce the overall cost ofthe system. The UHF F/O program office has proven
that it is far cheaper to integrate this package into an existing spacecraft bus than it is to
develop and entire special purpose satellite system.
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d. EHF Constellation
The EHF constellation will consist offour spacecraft deployed similarly to the
UHF F/O satellites. Each ofthe MILSTAR spacecraft are equipped with advanced LDR and
MDR payloads. The LDR payload will be outfitted with two spot beam transmit/receive
antennas, one wide spot beam transmit/receive antenna and one agile transmit antenna. The
MDR payload is equipped with eight steerable spot beam antennas. The combination of low
and medium data rate payloads will ensure that the system is able to meet the bandwidth
requirements of all users.
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H. IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT MBLSATCOM ARCHITECTURE ON
NAVAL FORCES
A. EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES
Naval forces follow a strict framework of organization when they are deployed. Each
force is organized in such a manner that it will be capable of meeting almost any operational
situation encountered during the period which they are deployed. This is accomplished by
assembling units in a consistent manner that leverages the capabilities of each individual
platform or command. The organization of a force begins on the Joint level and then cascades
down to individual naval units. One of the most common arrangements of naval forces is
known as a carrier battle group.
1. Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)
The carrier battle group is the largest contingent of naval forces which is deployed on
a regular basis. As the name implies, an aircraft carrier forms the heart of the battle group.
Numerous other types of ships such as cruisers, destroyers, frigates and submarines act as
screen and support units for the carrier. This arrangement of ships, aircraft and submarines
constitutes a formidable force. The CVBG is able to project its power, through the use of
aircraft and missiles, hundreds of miles into hostile territory and then relocate the entire battle
force before the adversary has time to react. It has proven to be an effective tool in
international politics and a potent deterrent in times of regional crisis.
One limitation on the capabilities of a CVBG is the availability of sufficient
communication capability. The intelligence and command structures of the group require
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tremendous amounts of information to plan and organize operations. This information
demand can be directly translated into bandwidth requirements. The current MILSATCOM
architecture is unable to provide the necessary bandwidth essential to support every aspect
of CVBG operations. This is evident by the fact that the Navy leases commercial
transponders to provide services which are unattainable through DoD-owned systems.
2. Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping is an evolving form of military operation which has the potential to
become a form oflow intensity combat. Forces deployed as peacekeepers are generally not
equipped for, nor intended to be involved in, high intensity hostilities. Their job is to act as
a barrier and keep distance between warring factions. As such, peacekeeping forces rely on
their communications to provide a means of escape in the event that a local situation becomes
violent. The availability and reliability of satellite communications could mean the difference
between life and death for multi-national peacekeepers in remote areas. One example of a
peacekeeping operation is the current involvement ofU.S. forces in Bosnia. Forces deployed
in this theater receive a higher priority for access to MILSATCOM assets due to the nature
and volatility of their mission.
3. Limited Regional Conflicts (LRCs)
Limited Regional Conflicts consist of operations confined to specific geographical
regions.
' Activities carried out by armed forces in these arenas fall short of total war. These
operations are generally characterized as a military deployment to an area for political
purposes which might not be of a classical military nature. Recent LRCs have been carried
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out under the guise of humanitarian operations. Large numbers of troops and equipment
might be required to achieve defined mission objectives in an LRC, even in the absence of
armed conflict. Such operations take large amounts of communications capabilities,
especially when friendly units are spread over large areas of rough terrain.
These types of operations have been growing in number since the end of the cold war.
This has been caused by the fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of power vacuums or
large scale human rights abuses in unstable political regions. Recent examples ofLRCs have
included Haiti and Somalia.
4. Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs)
Major Regional Conflicts are large scale military efforts which are located in a specific
geographical region. Unlike an LRC, an MRC involves armed conflict. Large numbers of
troops and equipment are required to achieve military dominance over an adversary. This
infers that large amounts of communications capabilities are required to ensure proper unit
coordination and prevent incidents of fratricide. In recent history, MRCs have required a
coalition of forces to achieve mission objectives. These coalition forces also require
communications capabilities. The U.S. has provided some of these capabilities to coalition
partners in recent operations. This is very efficient for enabling communication between
armed forces of different nationalities, but also usurps some of the limited SATCOM
resources available to U.S. armed forces. An example of an MRC is the Persian GulfWar or
Operation Desert Storm.
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B. NAVAL RELIANCE ON MILSATCOM
The Navy relies on MILSATCOM to provide many user applications. The use of
satellite assets enables deployed units to remain situationally aware on global events. It
allows ships at sea to download the latest imagery of an area of interest. It aids in planning
for strike and amphibious operations. Without MILSATCOM, commanders at sea would be
unable to update their superiors to changing environments. Joint Commanders would be
unable to maintain the necessary control required to direct units spread over hundreds of
miles. No current technology is capable of providing the same services or capabilities as
those available through satellite communications. It is for these reasons that the Navy has
become reliant on MILSATCOM.
C. U.S. MILSATCOM ASSETS
The following is a list of existing U.S. MILSATCOM assets.
1. UHF Assets
UHF satellites have comprised the backbone of Naval SATCOM for the past few
decades. Naval Space Command currently serves as the operational manager for UHF assets.
a. Fleet Satellite (FLTSA T)
The FLTSAT satellites are in geosynchronous orbits providing coverage
between 75 degrees North and 75 degrees South latitude. They have provided 9.6 kbps
service to the fleet for over 18 years. Each satellite is equipped with 22 channels and one
additional wideband 500 kHz channel. Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of a FLTSAT
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spacecraft. Current FLTSAT assets have exceeded their design life and are being replaced
by the UHF Follow-on system. [Ref. 5:p. 4-3]
Figure 2.1. Example ofFLTSAT Spacecraft. [Ref. 6:p.3-4]
b. Leased Satellite (LEASAT)
LEASAT is essentially a commercially developed system which was leased
from the Hughes corporation by the U.S. Navy. It is a geosynchronous communication
satellite system. This system was used as a supplement to the then existing UHF
communications network. Only one LEASAT remains in use. Figure 2.2 is an illustration of
a LEASAT spacecraft.
Figure 2.2. Example of a LEASAT Spacecraft. [Ref. 16:p. 11]
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Figure 2.3. Example of a UHF Follow-On Spacecraft. [Hughes, pg. 8]
c. UHF Follow-On System (UHF F/O)
UHF F/O is the Naval MILSATCOM system replacing the aging FLTSAT and
LEASAT spacecraft. When the constellation is complete in 1999, UHF F/O will cover the
United States, the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Ocean areas with two satellites per area and
one on-orbit spare. Figure 2.3 provides an illustration of the UHF F/O spacecraft. The
spacecraft will have a channel capacity of 39 UHF channels. The first seven UHF F/O
spacecraft have already been launched. The last three are undergoing upgrades to incorporate
the Global Broadcast System (GBS). [Ref. 8:p. 10]
d. Air Force Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM)
AFSATCOM is carried as a package on other spacecraft. The space segment
consists oftransponders carried on FLTSAT, LEASAT, DSCS, and other national satellites.
It provides Emergency Action Message (EAM) dissemination, JCS/CINC inter-netting, force
direction, and force report back. The coverage this system provides is global with the
exception ofthe South polar region. [Ref. 8:p. 11]
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2. SHF Assets
SHF assets provide the majority ofwide band services to the fleet. These assets have
not been fully utilized by Naval units in the past due to the terminal size required for
reception. This problem is being overcome by advances in communications technology.
a. Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS)
DSCS spacecraft provide worldwide, jam-resistant, secure voice and high data
rate communications for command and control, crisis management, and intelligence data
transfer service. The space segment consists of five DSCS HI satellites in geosynchronous
orbits with older versions ofDSCS spacecraft acting as on-orbit spares. SHF capabilities
have been incorporated into larger platforms such as carriers and large-deck amphibious ships.
This was done to ensure the minimum communications requirements for command and
control, intelligence, and war fighting were met. Figure 2.4 provides an example of a DSCS
spacecraft. [Ref 8:p. 12]
Figure 2.4. Example of a DSCS spacecraft. [Ref. 17:p. 24]
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3. EHF Assets
The Extremely High Frequency bandwidth provides virtually unjammable,
undetectable, secure, nuclear survivable communications for strategic and tactical users. A
relatively new technology, EHF uses numerous advanced communications and signal
processing techniques to perform its mission. These techniques include narrow beamwidths,
interleaving, frequency hopping, cross-links, and new on-board signal processing techniques.
[Ref. 8:p. 12]
a. Military Satellite Communications System (MILSTAR)
MILSTAR is an Air Force sponsored geosynchronous satellite
communications program. "The system is designed to provide secure, reliable, survivable
two-way worldwide communications between the command element and all segments of the
force through all levels of conflict." [Ref. 5:p. 4-59] Figure 2.5 provides an illustrated
example of a MILSTAR spacecraft. In the future, this system will provide both a Low Data
Rate and Medium Data Rate transmission capability. MILSTAR 1 and MILSTAR 2 are the
primary EHF satellites in the current inventory. These satellites are only capable of providing
LDR services. They operate on an uplink frequency between 43.5 and 45.5 GHZ. Their
downlink frequency lies between 20.2 and 21.2 GHz. [Ref. 5:p. 4-60]
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Figure 2.5. Example ofaMILSTAR Spacecraft. [Ref. 16:p. 13]
b. UHFF/O
EHF payload packages were placed on UHF F/O satellite 4 and all subsequent
UHF F/O spacecraft. The original package was to serve as a test-bed for MDLSTAR
technology. Results of the tests proved the benefits of the package warranted pursuing the
placement ofEHF transponders on all remaining spacecraft. This provided a cost effective
means of increasing EHF connectivity throughout the fleet. Current research is ongoing to
provide an EHF system with polar coverage. Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of the UHF
F/O spacecraft.
4. Global Broadcast Service (GBS) Program
The Global Broadcast Service Program was approved in September 1995 in response
to the need to quickly transmit high data rate files such as video and imagery to mobile users
throughout the world. GBS will leverage existing commercial technologies to provide a high
data rate, one-way dissemination capability. GBS will support the transmission of wide
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bandwidth products to any theater at an aggregate data rate of 23 Mbps. The system will
employ a method of smart push' in which relevant data will be broadcast to all units within
the footprint. It will also include mechanisms to allow 'user pull'. This infers that a user may
request data via other channels of communication and then have the data broadcast to them
via GBS. A military owned GBS capability will be resident on the final three UHF F/O
satellites. [Ref. 8:p. 12]
5. Commercial Service Providers
The U.S. military does not own enough satellite assets to provide all services required
by the Armed Forces. After researching alternatives, the Navy decided that certain required
services could best be supplied by leasing assets from commercial providers, rather than
acquiring new military systems.
a. International Maritime Satellite (INMARSA T)
INMARSAT is a global consortium which uses a series of geosynchronous
satellites to provide mobile satellite communication services to users on the land, in the sea
or in the air. By the end of 1996, over 250 U.S. Navy ships had been fitted with INMARSAT
terminals. These terminals provide voice channel surge capability and are an alternative to
DoD- owned SATCOM systems. It is important to realize that INMARSAT is a commercial
system and has some very significant limitations. The first is the cost of transmission. Costs
have run over ten dollars per minute on an INMARSAT circuit. This cost must be paid from
a ship's operational budget. A further constraint on the system is blockage and message
delays during periods of peak traffic. Another handicap is the ability of an adversary to
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geolocate a unit via ring-back on the user terminal. [Ref. 8:p. 14]
b. International Telecommunications Satellite (INTELSAT)
INTELSAT is a non-profit cooperative formed under the leadership of the
U.S. in 1964. It is owned and operated by 120 member nations and provides service to over
180 countries and territories. It maintains a fleet of20 GEO satellites and 2,700 earth stations
around the globe. Currently the U.S. Navy leases transponders from INTELSAT to provide
additional data throughput to its ships. This program is commonly referred to as 'Challenge
Athena'. A single channel leased from an INTELSAT spacecraft provides 1 .544 Mbps duplex
communications to subscribers. This bandwidth is divided to provide different information
services required by the platform. Due to the requirement for a seven foot dish antenna, and
its accompanying fourteen-foot diameter radome, only aircraft carriers and certain select
amphibious command ships are able to receive this service. [Ref. 8:p. 15]
D. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The capability and capacity of a MTLSATCOM architecture has direct implications
on a CVBG. The capacity of the system limits the amount of intelligence or command data
to which the group has access. This impacts directly on a task force commander's ability to
plan and coordinate battle group operations.
1. MDR/HDR
The current trend in satellite communications is toward MDR/HDR transmission.
This is a large improvement over previous capabilities. Early systems which served the fleet
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were only able to provide services at 2.4 or 4.8 kbps. The transition to wideband services
provides an operational commander with much greater communications capacity, and
therefore, more flexibility.
2. Imagery
Imagery products consume large amounts oftransmission bandwidth. A typical image
can consist of tens to hundreds ofmega-bytes of data. Products of this size take long periods
of time to transmit on LDR and some MDR circuits. The time of transmission correlates
directly to cost and operational effectiveness. Transmission time on a transponder is
analogous to a long distance telephone call in that the longer the message, the higher the cost.
Also, the circuit is unavailable for other applications while it is being utilized to transmit an
imagery product. This situation is being resolved as modern satellites transition to higher data
rates. A satellite which downlinks at 1.544 Mbps can transmit a ten mega-byte image in
approximately six seconds compared to the almost sixteen minutes required for a 9.6 Kbps
transmission. This increase in transmission speed will allow deployed units to receive
important imagery and still have transponder free-time for other essential applications.
3. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
C4ISR is very closely related to the Imagery and HDR/MDR sections discussed
above. Imagery is an important Intelligence product and, therefore, imagery downloads could
be considered a C4ISR function. By increasing the data rates available to Naval commanders,
we will vastly increase their command and control capabilities. These increases could be
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realized in the form ofmore command, or tactical, communication circuits. Surveillance and
reconnaissance operations can require high bandwidth for imagery and other data collection.
An example is the Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System (BGPHES) which
requires a multi-Mega bit channel for operation. There will also be a greater demand placed
on SATCOM channels for beyond line-of-sight transmissions, as the fleet develops a greater
reliance on UAVs. The envisioned information-intensive conflicts of the future demand
increased C4I bandwidth for just such functions. This will allow a smaller, leaner force to
operate more efficiently in the face of adversaries possessing superior numbers.
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IQ. ENVISIONED MELSATCOM REQUIREMENTS
A. INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS DATA BASE (ICDB)
The Integrated Communications Database (ICDB) is a repository of communications
requirements which are maintained by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). "It
is a comprehensive data base of communications requirements for DoD and selected non-
DoD government agencies." [Ref. 18:p. 8] It is here that governmental entities define their
communication needs. Requirements may be entered into the data base on either of two
criteria: the type of circuit needed or bandwidth required. The data base itself contains
various types of information which includes circuit protection, topology and coverage. All
information held within the ICDB is focused on current communication capabilities, not those
projected in the future. It identifies terrestrial and commercial SATCOM lease information
as well as military SATCOM requirements data. [Ref. 18:p. 8]
DISA uses the ICDB as a management tool. It attempts to mate stated requirements
for each entity represented in the data base with available assets. Agencies presenting higher
national priorities will be allocated a larger percentage of resources. New additions to the
data base are submitted by military CINCs and national agency heads. Once submissions
have been received, they are validated by the Joint Staff and then entered as a requirement.
After this procedure is complete, DISA may allocate services to fulfil the requirement.
B. EMERGING REQUIREMENTS DATA BASE (ERDB)
The Emerging Requirements Data Base (ERDB) is a tool for predicting future
communications system requirements. The requirements held in the ERDB are independent
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ofthose specified in the ICDB. The ERDB provides an estimate of specific capabilities which
will be necessary to support future military operations. Systems capable of fulfilling the
majority ofthese requirements do not yet exist. The ERDB makes assumptions as to the state
oftechnology in the near future. This is a difficult task considering the tremendous growth
rate oftechnology. In recent years, computer performance technology has doubled every 1
8
months to 2 years. This turn over in technology makes predicting communications
capabilities 15 years in the future very difficult. [Ref. 18:p. 8]
There are a number of factors which must be considered when determining emerging
requirements. A change in force structure is one such factor. Changes in structure demand
changes in infrastructure. Today's military is becoming smaller and hopefully more efficient.
As the number of ships and battalions decrease, the need for new command and control
systems increases. Information superiority is becoming a key word in future military
operations. Increased information requirements collates directly with increased
communications capabilities. [Ref. 18:p. 8]
New technologies and weapons development create additional requirements for future
systems. New 'smart weapons' and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) require large amounts
ofbandwidth to create real-time video links with command centers. Current systems would
be overloaded by transmitting video feeds required by these new and emerging weapons
systems. Changes in doctrine, how the military is to operate or employ its weapons, can also
lead to increased communications requirements. This is closely linked to force structure
changes and the emergence of new weapons. [Ref. 18:p. 8]
Requirements in the ERDB are approved by the Joint Staff. Their purpose is to act
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as a tool in planning and analysis for future systems. They balance communications
requirements against the force structure required to counter threats predicted in the future.
This data base requires continual updates due to the high technology growth rates and the
volatility of predicted threats.
C. NAVAL SATCOM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Functional requirements are the means via which operational users are able to define
their system needs to acquisition professionals. A functional requirement, specifically, is a
function or operation which has been identified by the user as necessary for a system to be
operationally effective. The user describes, or quantifies, the system performance
characteristics which are to be achieved so that system alternatives may be competitively
evaluated with respect to their effectiveness. Once functional requirements have been
sufficiently defined, the acquisition community will then use these requirements to develop
or acquire the most efficient, operationally effective system possible within the program
funding restraints. The proper identification offunctional requirements are, therefore, critical
in fielding an effective operational system.
1. Impact of Proposed Systems
It has been proposed that, in the near future, information systems operating in
accordance with mission demand will equate to combat efficiency
.
[Ref. 17:p. 12] If this
vision is true, then an investment in information systems will have a dramatic impact on future
combat effectiveness. Currently, there are a myriad of specific services required by fleet units
which may only be provided by SATCOM. Naval units are multi-mission capable and thus
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require multiple SATCOM systems to provide all required services. The Navy of the future
must integrate these services into more streamlined and robust information systems. This
section will examine functional requirements which have been defined for the proposed
systems. [Ref 17:p. 12]
2. Limitations of Current Systems
Current MELSATCOM systems are capable of satisfying the majority of today's
communications requirements. These systems, however, lack the capacity to handle the
projected bandwidth required by information intensive operations expected throughout the
next 10 to 15 years. Specific limitations have been identified in each of the existing SATCOM
systems. This section will describe the specific limitations noted and thus provide more
insight to capabilities that must be satisfied by any follow-on systems.
a. Connectivity
According to the DoD Advanced Satellite Communications Capstone
Requirements Document, [Ref. 19], connectivity is directly related to coverage and capacity.
Today's legacy systems provide coverage to most areas in which the United States takes
interest. While DoD-owned systems provide coverage to the majority ofthese areas, they do
not possess the capacity necessary to provide all services to DoD users. Commercial
transponders have been leased in order to provide greater capacity in regions where there is
a shortfall of resources. [Ref. 19:p. 3-2]
The North Polar region is an area of vital importance to the U.S. military.
Ballistic missile submarines routinely operate under the ice-cap and require communications
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connectivity with their respective commands. Due to their orbital geometry, GEO
communications satellites are unable to provide coverage in this region. This creates a
definite communications requirement for forces serving at the pole. The only system currently
providing coverage to this area is the Air Force SATCOM packages operating from other
national platforms. [Ref. 19:p. 3-2]
Warfare in the future will be highly mobile. As a result, SATCOM on the
move will be a key criteria for operational success. Current systems lack the capability to
provide high throughput to mobile users and command structures. "Further, these systems
do not efficiently use the limited spectrum available to disseminate information products to
multiple users." [Ref. 19:p. 3-3] There is also a definite lack of surge capacity in the current
systems. These systems will be nearing their maximum throughput to support daily
operations in the future. They do not posses the capacity necessary to support surge
communication requirements resulting from regional crises.
By examining connectivity limitations in the current system, it is apparent that
any successful MELSATCOM system must provide greater coverage and capacity.
b. Protection
"Protection includes defensive Information Warfare (IW), Anti-Jam,
covertness, nuclear survivability, resistance to physical destruction, and U.S. control of
SATCOM access." [Ref. 19:p. 3-4] The MTLSATCOM systems of today do not meet these
benchmarks of protection.
The only current system designed specifically for nuclear survivability is the
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MILSTAR constellation. Even so, the spacecraft already in orbit only provide LDR data
services and would be unable to support fleet operations by themselves. "Current commercial
systems lack the protection against disruption and exploitation required to support many
military operations. They cannot provide the anti-scintillation and other protection from
nuclear effects to support NCA requirements for command and control." [Ref. 19:p. 3-4]
Information warfare, or information operations, is a growing threat as the
world enters the information age. The majority of current systems were designed prior to the
explosion of information technology. As such, "neither DoD nor commercial SATCOM
systems are sufficiently protected against unauthorized intrusion, monitoring, and the
disclosure of sensitive information." [Ref. 19:p. 3-4]
In the future, protection of information systems will be a key to operational
success. Current MILSATCOM systems do not provide adequate protection for military
communications. Future systems will be required to maintain a much higher standard of
communications security in order to assure friendly forces maintain information dominance.
c. Access and Control
The military has devoted a significant effort to ensure that current
communications systems provide sufficient access and control for operational users.
"However, there are still shortcomings in being able to provide the desired timely and
dynamic configuration and reconfiguration of SATCOM resources. Support for new or
changing requirements must be carefully planned and often result in disrupting existing
accesses while new requirements are being loaded." [Ref. 19:p. 3-5]
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U.S. armed forces employ commercial systems, in addition to DoD-owned
systems, to provide some SATCOM capabilities. Commercial systems present their own
dilemmas for access and control. "Military users will always have to contend with
commercial users, as well as each other, for access to commercial systems. The warfighter
cannot depend entirely on commercial capability for immediate surge capacity of critically
needed communications anywhere in the world at unprecedented times and locations." [Ref
19:p. 3-5]
Access and control have always been identified as critical issues by military
SATCOM users. They will continue to grow in importance as we enter the information age.
Today's systems do not provide timely access to users as crises evolve around the world. The
current management system for adding channel requirements to SATCOM systems is too
slow. It may negatively impact the operational effectiveness of units deployed in rapidly
changing threat environments. Future systems should provide a more dynamic means for
adding channel requirements to SATCOM systems. It should also strive to make network
reconfiguration as transparent as possible to users on the network. [Ref. 19:p. 3.6]
d. Interoperability
Jointness has become a key word in modern military operations. One major
premise of Joint forces is that the systems owned by each of the services should be
interoperable with those of other friendly services. "The evolution of current DoD-owned
SATCOM systems resulted in separate systems development, optimized for specific user
communities, without sufficient interoperability between frequency bands and different classes
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of users within a frequency band." [Ref. 19:p. 3-6] Loosely translated this means the
communications systems from each of the services have difficulty operating with those of
other services. "Furthermore, commercial systems (especially Mobile Satellite Service,
[MSS]/Personal Communications Service [PCS]) have limited, if any, direct interoperability
between one another without recourse to the public switched network or other intermediate
communications media." [Ref. 19:p. 3-6]
To ensure greater efficiency in future Joint operations, future MILSATCOM
systems should be developed by representatives from each of the services. This would ensure
that requirements from each of the services were identified and incorporated into the design
throughout the development of the system. Introducing requirements early in the design
process can save money by eliminating the need for engineering change proposals later in the
production of the spacecraft. By ensuring all high priority requirements are integrated into
the system design early, military users can increase the overall effectiveness of the system
while achieving a lower system acquisition cost.
e. Flexibility
"Flexibility relates to the ability ofU.S. forces to use SATCOM while engaged
in mobile, dynamic military operations across the full range of the spectrum of conflict." [Ref.
19:p. 3-7]
"Current DoD-owned systems do not communicate well on-the-move at
needed data rates. The number ofmobile terminals will greatly increase, but today's systems
cannot provide the power or bandwidth to support those terminals." [Ref. 19:p. 3-7] When
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the Capstone Requirements Document speaks of mobile terminals, it places the emphasis on
smaller platforms such as aircraft and ground mobile units. Ships are mobile but travel at
speeds slow enough to remain in a footprint for an extended period of time. They also posses
enough room to house relatively large antennas which are able to supply a significant amount
of bandwidth.
Today's systems do not provide enough bandwidth to support terminals which
are currently fielded. "Except for upcoming DAMA initiatives, few efforts have been made
to conserve bandwidth. Furthermore, today's terminals are not always optimized for the user
and platform." [Ref. 19:p. 3-7] Not leveraging technology to develop further methods for
frequency reuse limits the flexibility of existing systems. An effective means of frequency
reuse could dramatically increase the numbers ofusers which could access a given system at
any time.
Development of operational techniques and advanced communication
technology which will increase the flexibility of future systems and will also enhance the
operational effectiveness of the U.S. military. New means of frequency reuse or multiple
access techniques will enable greater numbers of units to access and capitalize on
MILSATCOM assets. This will provide operational commanders greater control over forces
spread across large regions.
/ Quality ofservice
"Current DoD-owned SATCOM systems may not be able to support future
more stringent quality requirements (e.g. for Asynchronous Transfer Mode). Similarly, the
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current systems will probably not meet future requirements for voice recognition and
intelligibility." [Ref. 19:p. 3-7] The majority of today's Naval voice SATCOM circuits
operate at 2.4 kbps. There is a push, more specifically in the Marine Corps, to increase the
bandwidth for some voice circuits. Marines feel that commanders can gain more insight into
a situation by being able to hear the 'tension and stress' in someone's voice. In order to
increase the quality of voice communication, it is required to increase the sampling rate on
the voice signal. This translates directly into greater bandwidth. Assumptions for the loading
analysis state that high quality voice will be at 4.8 kbps. Considering the trend toward wider
bandwidth communications in commercial systems, it is plausible to assume that the
requirement for high quality voice could creep up to 9.6 kbps in the near future.
Today's SATCOM systems will not be able to adequately support tomorrow's
weapons, C4ISR, and support systems' quality demands. This will lead to loss of
information, delays and blockages, and denying users access to perishable, time-sensitive
information. Situational awareness and dominant battle space knowledge will be diminished
and weapons and C4ISR system efficiency will be greatly reduced, which will put mission
success at risk. [Ref. 19:p. 3-8]
3. Required System Characteristics
DoD-owned SATCOM systems support the DoD mission areas by providing the
requisite connectivity, protection, access and control, flexibility, quality of service, and
interoperability. These are required system characteristics for SATCOM systems. While
affordability is not listed as a specific technical system characteristic, it will be a key driver













> Information +C4ISR +Precision Munitions =combat Power.
>Warfighter Information demands are growing in response to technology.
Connectivity cannot be a limiting factor in the application of combat power.
>SATCOM = Assured warfighter connectivity when/where needed.
SATCOM supports globally dispersed land, sea, air and space operations.
•SATCOM provides dynamic, multiple information transfer capabilities.
>Our C4I is a prime target and a center of gravity.
Must deny adversary the ability to decapitate our C4ISR capabilities.
>Nuclear deterrence remains a top DoD priority (Survivability)
>Must provide anti-jam and protection from SIGINT and information warfare.
>Available access on-demand; fundamental SATCOM need of the warfighter.
Warfighter's assured access should not be denied (within CINC/JTF priorities.
Warfighters must have control over their information and SATCOM domains.
Timely, responsive process of apportioning and reapportioning SATCOM capacity.
Appropriate force level controls access to allocated capacity.
>New and unscheduled user's demands for communications can be accommodated.
>Warfighter can monitor status of allocated SATCOM resources.
>Allocated resources can be rapidly and dynamically reconfigured.
Interoperability between ground, air, maritime, and SOF forces (JTF Components).
Facilitate interoperability with Allies, Coalition partners and Government Agencies.
>Provide seamless Terrestrial-to-Satellite Information Transfer.
>Ensure capability of Information Transfer between Commercial and Military means.
Warfighters prosecute military operations across a wide spectrum of conflict.
>Accommodate changing/evolving requirements, threats, technologies, capabilities.
Emphasis is on mobile operations.
>A wide variety of operating frequencies is needed to support the Warfighters needs.
Must make efficient use of limited frequency spectrum.
"Systems must be reliable and easy to use.
Performance must meet needs of supported information systems.
Information must be transferred accurately and unambiguously.
DoD SATCOM systems should be capable of degrading gracefully.
Table 3.1. Required System Characteristics. [Ref. 19:p. 1-13]
Table 3.1 provides a listing ofthe top level functional requirements for the SATCOM
system. The requirements are divided into categories and then subdivided into more specific
line items within each requirement category.
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4. Challenges for the Future
There are many challenges which face the Navy as it prepares for the deployment of
the next generation ofMTJLSATCOM assets. Many of the problems which must be solved
are directly related to the size, shape, and mobility of ships.
a. Mast Sizefor Antenna Installation
Platform mast space is one constraint for shipboard SATCOM capabilities.
Each ship in the U.S. Navy maintains a multitude of antennas which service a variety of
purposes. The majority of a ships antennas are housed atop the ship's mast on yardarms.
This location reduces radiation hazards to personnel and does not interfere with the majority
of shipboard operations. Larger platforms have more space to accommodate new and larger
antennas. Aircraft carriers or large deck amphibious assault ships can carry approximately
130 topside antennas. Smaller platforms, however, are very limited in the amount of antennas
they are able to carry. Destroyers and frigates may be limited to approximately 50 topside
antennas. A submarine might have as few as a dozen. [Ref 17:p. 32]
The available space for an antenna is not the only consideration when
contemplating the installation of a new system. That systems support equipment must also
be considered. Terminal equipment, power supplies and electronics all add weight to the ship.
The weight and location of placement must be carefully considered with respect to ship
stability. Studies should be undertaken to evaluate the effects of system placement on radar
cross-section. Integrating a new syc+em into an existing ship is a very complex evolution
which involves many different syste. throughout the entire ship and not just mast space.
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b. Mobility
Ships are mobile by nature. They can travel hundreds of miles per day and
change course at any time. Modem shipboard SATCOM systems have to be able to track the
satellite they are communicating with. Shore stations do not have to do this when
communicating with a GEO spacecraft. Ships, on the other hand, are constantly changing
direction and experiencing movement caused by the pitch and roll of the ocean. This creates
a need for a stabilized antenna which can track the satellite with which it is to communicate.
Mobility of ships can also create a problem for the spacecraft. As ships move
they can travel out of a spot beam. This means that the spacecraft might have to redirect its
spot beam to provide continual coverage for a battle group at sea. Again, this is different
from a fixed shore site which does not move. Mobility ofthe platform creates a number of
complexities both for the platform and the spacecraft.
c. Electromagnetic Interference
Electromagnetic interference (EMI) is a large problem for ships. Ships are
relatively small and electronic systems are required to be located physically near one another.
Interference can occur between systems which operate in or near a common frequency band.
It can also occur if one system has a harmonic which falls in another systems operating
frequency. Other means ofinterference can include radars and other nations communications
systems. Shore bases can separate systems by locating them on opposite sides of the base in
order to reduce the interference. This is not an option on a ship. Naval users must conduct
EMI surveys prior to the installation of a new system to ensure there is no interference
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between the new system and existing systems. If interference is found between systems, a
study must be conducted to determine the best means of reducing or eliminating it.
5. Network Descriptors
Before discussing circuit requirements for the battle group, it is important to
understand certain terms and how they relate to networks. This section identifies network
descriptors used to characterize requirements for future MTLSATCOM systems.
a. Network Type
There are three basic types ofnetworks used in Naval communications. They
are voice, video and data networks. Voice networks transmit voice commands or instructions
from one place to another. Data networks are used to create links of digital data connecting
different users. Video circuits are relatively new to Naval communications. This is a video
link between two or more location that allows information to be transmitted via both audio
and video channels.
b. Protection
There is a variety of protection that can be afforded to a communications
circuit. It is important to ensure that the protection provided to circuit is commensurate with
the data transmitted on that circuit. This is important because greater protection leads to
higher cost and possibly less throughput.
For Naval purposes, High protection is defined as nuclear survivable. This
type of protection will be provided to national level command and control circuits. Medium
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protection offers protection against tactical jammers. This type of protection will be used on
vital circuits for deployed battle groups. Low protection is designed to eliminate disturbances
caused by nuisance jammers. Finally, None means that the circuit operates with no protection
from outside interruptions. [Ref. 17:p. Ill]
c. Data Rates
Data rate is defined as the speed at which data is transferred. Naval
communication systems operate at a variety of data rates. Low data rates are described as
those below 9.6 Kbps. Medium data rates are those between 9.6 Kbps and 1.544 Mbps.
High data rates are those which are greater than 1 .544 Mbps. [Ref. 17:p. Ill]
a\ Mobility
Communications are required continuously between operational Naval units.
Ships are mobile in every since ofthe word, but are larger and more capable than many other
mobile platforms which also require SATCOM capabilities. This means that ships have
enough space to maintain suits ofcommunications gear. This is not true with all mobile units.
It is important to consider unit size and capabilities needed when deterrnining requirements
for a SATCOM system. Some ofthe different types of units to be analyzed are land mobile
units such as command vans, man-portable units such as a man pack, ships, submarines and
aircraft. Each ofthese platforms have different communication needs and capabilities which




There are many forms of topology which can be implemented in a
communications network. The type of topology chosen for a particular network should best
support the amount of traffic and the sensitivity of the data transmitted on that circuit. The
topology most often utilized by Naval users is a Netted circuit. A netted circuit is defined as
an open channel with multiple users on it at the same time. Users access the network as
required, but all other users are able to hear their transmission. Hub and Spoke is another
popular topology. Here there is a central net control center with other users able to access
the network by going through the control center. When drawn out it appears as a hub with
spokes radiating from it. There is also the standard point-to-point configuration. This is
similar to a telephone call where there is one caller and one receiver. Other forms of
networks which are gaining in popularity are broadcast networks and virtual networks similar
to the Internet. A broadcast network is a circuit with a central control station that transmits
broadcasts to all net participants. Only the central Control station is permitted to transmit on
the circuit. A virtual network can best be described as similar to the Internet. Users would
access the circuit to retrieve required data. [Ref. 17:p. Ill]
/ Coverage
A communications network can be designed to provide a variety of coverages.
Some links are intended to operate only inside a particular unit similar to a Local Area
Network (LAN). Other networks might be used for intra-battle group links to provide
connectivity for local units. Other, more far reaching, forms of coverage are also required.
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Theater commanders want control over all units operating in their areas of responsibility.
This creates a need for regional networks. There is also a need for reach back to the
continental United States, and some global communications networks. [Ref 17:p. Ill]
6. Circuit Requirements
There are specific requirements for the type and number of circuits to support a carrier
battle group in the future. These requirements are broken down into three categories: voice,
video and data. This section describes specifically described fleet circuit requirements.
a. Voice Requirements
There are a total of 300 voice circuit requirements which have already been
defined for a CVBG. The following is a breakdown of those requirements.
Ofthe 300 voice circuits, coverage is divided among shore (trunk lines), shore
(discrete lines) and Intra-Battle Group circuits. Shore trunk lines are large bandwidth circuits
which are transmitted, via satellites, to the shore. These channels may transmit many
individual circuits at one time. A shore discrete line is a channel which transmits only one
circuit back to a shore site via a satellite transmission. There are to be 120 shore (trunk lines)
and Intra-Battle Group circuits. There will also be 60 shore (discrete lines). [Ref. 17:p. 105]
The topology of the voice circuits is broken down into netted and point-to-
point circuits. 80% of the circuits are point-to-point. The other 20% of the circuits are
netted. [Ref 17:p. 105]
The quality ofthe circuits will be either high or basic quality. Only 40% of the
circuits will be high quality while the other 60% will be basic quality. [Ref. 17:p. 105]
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The protection afforded to each circuit will differ according to the importance
ofthe information carried. 38% ofvoice circuits will have no protection. 40% will have low
protection. 20% will have medium protection which will leave the final 2% with high
protection. [Ref 17:p. 105]
b. Video Requirements
The Naval Space Command Functional Requirements Document defines future
requirements for 20 video circuits to support a CVBG. The following is a breakdown of
those circuits.
The 20 video circuits will be required to provide coverage over varying
geographical areas. Only one circuit will be required for global communications. Five circuits
will be necessary to provide connectivity with the continental United States. There are also
five circuits identified as regional requirements. The remaining nine circuits are to be used
for intra-battle group communications. [Ref. 17:p. 105]
There are three data rate requirements related to video circuits. Four of the
circuits will require data rates of 64 kbps. The majority of the circuits, 12, specify a
requirement for 256 kbps. The remaining four circuits are required to operate at 2.048 Mbps
[Ref. 17:p. 105]
Varying topology requirements have been specified for battle group video
circuits. Six ofthe circuits will be used for broadcast purposes. Four circuits will be required
for point-to-point communication. The remaining ten circuits will provide netted access for
users. One example of this type of access could be the Battle Group Commander's nightly
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'fire-side chat' with his unit commanders. [Ref. 17:p.l05]
Differing levels of protection have been specified for battle group video
circuits. One half, 10, of the circuits will require no protection. One circuit has been
specified as requiring low protection. The remaining nine circuits will be provided with
medium protection. [Ref 17:p. 105]
c. Data Requirements
Naval planners have determined that future CVBG operations will need 285
data link circuits to meet all information requirements. These links will provide majority of
the CVBGs information requirements as opposed to voice or data circuits.
Future battle group data communications will be similar to current links in that
they will be call upon for connectivity both on a global and a unit level. 14 links will be
specified to provide global coverage for commanders. 71 circuits will be employed for
communication with the continental United States. 157 circuits are identified as regional
communication links. The remaining 43 circuits are for intra-battle group communications.
[Ref. 17:p. 105]
Differing data rate requirements have been specified for battle group data
circuits. 171 ofthese data links will provide services at rates of 9.6 kbps or less. Only 37 are
to operate at 64 kbps. 71 circuits will provide service at either 256 kbps or 5 12 kbps. The
remaining six circuits will employ data rates of 2.048 Mbps. [Ref. 17:p. 105]
As with the other types of circuits, data circuits will be afforded protection
based upon the information they carry. 28 circuits will require no protection. 29 circuits have
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been identified as requiring low protection. The majority, or 214 circuits, will be provided
with medium protection. The remaining 14 links will operate with high protection. [Ref. 17:p.
105]
The topology of data circuits will vary depending on the purpose of the circuit.
28 data links will be used as broadcast channels to support the battle group. 143 circuits will
be incorporated as hub and spoke data links. 86 data links have been specified as point-to-
point circuits. The remaining 28 circuits will operate in a netted fashion. [Ref. 17:p. 105]
7. SATCOM Vulnerabilities
There are a number of vulnerabilities associated with satellite communications.
Satellite footprints are generally very large. Information is transmitted from the spacecraft
to all points within the beam footprint. Any forces within that area are capable of receiving
the transmission. The relatively stable position of a GEO spacecraft creates a target for an
adversary and a potential vulnerability for the system. LEO satellites are predictable and,
therefore, are also vulnerable. Ground stations provide another point of weakness in the
system. This section of the thesis will explore the vulnerabilities associated with different
links throughout the communication chain.
a. Communications Channel Jamming (Non-destructive)
Jamming is defined as "transmitting a large modulated carrier to a receive
terminal at approximately the same frequency, overwhelming the desired signal and thus
disabling the link." [Ref. 7:p. 548] Any receive terminal may be subjected to some form of
jamming, either intentionally or incidentally. Jamming is a form ofElectronic Warfare (EW)
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and is a relatively inexpensive means to impair a communications system. An adversary may
target the space segment, terminals or even the terrestrial network to disrupt military
command and control functions. Protection against EW is vital to the effectiveness of a
communications network. It is important to identify methods to protect the system against
the effects ofjamming.
(1) SPACE SEGMENT. The space segment of a geosynchronous
communications satellite system is the most vulnerable segment of the network. This is
because the location ofthe satellite is commonly available through public information sources.
Ephemeris data for all Earth orbiting satellites can be found on the Internet. This data
provides a detailed description of the orbital parameters for a particular spacecraft. Such
information would provide a potential adversary all data necessary to target any satellite.
A well designed MILSATCOM architecture must be capable of
addressing EW threats. The communications system must include some form of anti-jam (AT)
or electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM) capability for each of its various links.
Instituting such capabilities, however, reduces the total capacity of the system. These
protective measures require more power and bandwidth to increase communications security.
This, therefore, reduces the amount ofbandwidth available for data transmission. [Ref 20:p.
109]
The degree to which a communication system may be jammed is
dependent on the operational characteristics of that system. The following are a few of the
critical factors which must be considered throughout the system design process: Transmitter
power, type ofmodulation employed, bandwidth utilized, frequency agility, receiver design,
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antenna gain and directivity, antenna steerability, and the ability to adapt the transmission
format and data rate in response to a jamming event. Successful communication systems
should carefully incorporate all of the above characteristics into the development of the
system. This will improve the operational effectiveness of the system in a jamming
environment. [Ref. 21:p. 342]
Current systems have developed some AJ or ECCM techniques to
ensure more secure communication for network users. The first of these is spread spectrum
transmissions. In spread spectrum transmission, the carrier is spread over a wide bandwidth
through the use of a spreading code. "The noise-like character of the transmitted signal is
produced by having an information-bearing binary sequence modulate a bandwidth spreading
sequence that acts as a carrier." [Ref. 22:p. 550] A receiver must have the code used to
spread the signal in order to recover it. This increases the security of the system because the
carrier wave is 'hidden' in the transmission noise floor and the receiver has to have the correct
code to reproduce the transmitted information. The signal may still be jammed, but it is more
difficult for an adversary to identify the target transmission frequency.
Other techniques which may be employed to reduce the effectiveness
ofjamming on a system are: "increased effective satellite power for the ground terminals,
satellite receive antenna discrimination, processing transponders, and increased effective
power in the satellite." [Ref. 21 :p. 342] The use of these techniques either by themselves or
in concert will increase the resistance of the system to jamming.
(2) TERMINALS. Terminals are susceptible to jamming in the same
manner as the spacecraft is. Measures must be taken to protect user terminals from jamming
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in addition to the protection provided to the satellite. An adversary only has to interfere with
one segment of a communications network to effectively jam the entire system. It would,
therefore, be a waste of tax dollars to protect the space segment from jamming and neglect
other segments.
One of the most effective means of protecting the terminal is spread
spectrum transmission. Network receivers should be the only terminals with the spreading
codes. An adversary would have a difficulty detecting the transmission. Other methods of
protection could include more directional antennas and increased active ECCM methods.
(3) NETWORK. Networks require protection from jamming and
intrusion as do the satellites and terminals. Some effective means of protecting a network are
DAMA polling and user protocols. Polling refers to a central control station querying
participating units at defined intervals and requiring a 'pass word' for access to the network.
Once the control station verifies their identification, reporting stations are allowed to make
reports and receive updates. Protocols are defined as "a software design that specifies the
details ofhow computers interact, including the format of messages they exchange and how
errors are handled." [Ref. 23 :p. 467] Computers wishing to participate in the network require
a copy of the protocols to effectively transmit and receive data.
b. Electronic Attack (Destruction or Impairment)
Unlike jamming, an electronic attack is intended to either destroy or impair the
target system or sensor. An adversary may eliminate a communications link by carrying out
an electronic attack on the space segment of a system. Terminals and fiber lines may be
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repaired relatively easily. Satellites are generally not repairable once they have been damaged.
With this in mind, it is important to consider methods of countering electronic attack when
designing a space based communications network.
(1) SPACE SEGMENT. Communications satellites contain very
sensitive receivers to detect ground based transmissions. It is possible to damage or destroy
some of these sensors by transmitting an extremely strong signal on or near the tuned
frequency of some ofthese components. The low-noise amplifier, high-power amplifier and
mixers are vulnerable to this form of electronic attack. These components require protection
from electronic attack. One means ofproviding this protection is installing filters to eliminate
signals which exceed a certain strength threshold. This would reduce the power allowed into
the components and thus, prevent damage to them.
(2) TT&C FUNCTIONS. Electronic attack may also be carried out
against the control functions of a satellite. Each satellite requires station keeping and
command signals from ground stations. If an adversary were able to duplicate these signals,
they could send damaging commands to the satellite. They could change the orbit, switch off
components or possibly de-orbit the spacecraft. If they are unable to duplicate the
transmission to the satellite, they could simplyjam friendly commands to the spacecraft. This
would prohibit friendly users from accessing the vehicle to update missions and station
keeping data. In either case, friendly usage of the satellite has been reduced or excluded.
Highly directional antennas, spread spectrum transmissions and data
encryption provide some solutions to these issues. The above techniques, when used in
unison, make unfriendly interference with TT&C functions very difficult.
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c. Physical Destruction
Many nations do not possess the technical capability to jam or electronically
interfere with U.S. communication systems. Physical destruction of a communication node
provides these nations, or other organizations, with a means of disrupting military
communications through the use of classical military hardware or other non-conventional
methods. It is vital to the effectiveness of the system that these low-technology threats be
identified and addressed during the system design process. Early identification of system
threats allows greater flexibility in designing a secure and physically protected system.
(1) NETWORK CONTROL CENTER (NCC). The Network Control
Center is the command center for a communication system. It exercises control over the
operation of system components. Generally the NCC is a facility or complex that houses the
majority of the computing capacity for a communications system. This is an easily
identifiable target for those wishing to disrupt communications. It can be physically destroyed
or damaged to hamper its operation. There are also other means of attacking the NCC such
as cutting its power supply, injuring key personnel, or interrupting other utilities.
It is important to identify potential physical threats to a specific
network command facility. By identifying these threats, steps can be taken to isolate and
protect the system and personnel. Constructing the complex in a secluded location and
providing a modern security systems is a good start. Command centers located in populous
areas are much easier targets because they are simpler to reconnoiter and plan an attack. In
general, relatively simple methods can be used to protect the NCC from physical attack. The
key is to develop a comprehensive list of the physical threats which a facility might face.
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(2) SPACE SEGMENT. The space segment is vulnerable to physical
destruction. Satellites maintain nearly constant orbits and have no onboard defensive systems.
A technologically advanced adversary could carry out a successful anti-satellite (ASAT)
attack on some U.S. space based assets. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to destroy
the entire U.S. space arsenal because of the numbers of spacecraft currently in orbit. This
does not mean, however, that the loss of one or two satellites would not harm military
operations. There is no system available to replace a MILSTAR spacecraft if one were
destroyed. Currently the only means of protecting from an ASAT attack is to identify a
potential attacker and destroy their vehicle prior to launch. Once they have launched, there
is no system to intercept the threat spacecraft. The only means of avoidance is to alter the
orbit ofthe target satellite significantly. This requires large amounts of fuel and reduces the
life of the satellite.
(3) NUCLEAR. Both the space and ground segments are vulnerable
to nuclear attack. Blast and radiation can adversely effect the performance of both segments.
MILSTAR and some other systems were designed to survive nuclear attacks. They were
hardened to provide protection against the increased radiation caused by an exo-atmospheric
nuclear detonation. They cannot survive blast effects though. The only means to prevent
nuclear attack on U.S. ground or spaced based assets is through diplomacy and compliance
with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement.
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d. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
U.S. space based communications assets are subject to SIGINT collection.
An intelligence collector inside the footprint of a satellite downlink has the capability of
copying that signal. Migration to higher frequency communication has the potential to limit
the collection ofU.S. signals. Higher frequency systems have smaller footprints, thus making
it harder for a collector to enter the transmission area without alerting friendly forces. Spread
spectrum transmissions also make it more difficult for intelligence organizations to collect
data on satellite transmission. One important consideration is to provide protection
commensurate with the data being passed on a network. This, combined with other
communications security methods, smaller beam widths and spread spectrum will limit
friendly vulnerability to SIGINT.
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IV. SYSTEM LOADING METHODOLOGY
A. MAJOR SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS
In developing a scenario for the loading analysis, certain assumptions were made with
regard to specific aspects of military operations. The purpose of this section is to explain the
assumptions which were made during this analysis. This will provide the reader with a better
understanding of the study results.
1. Assumptions for Emerging Naval Requirements
Naval Space Command developed certain assumptions about future SATCOM
capabilities, which were derived from the Naval Satellite Communications Functional
Requirements Document (FRD)[Ref. 17]. These assumptions were then used as entry points
into the ERDB for the analysis. The ERDB describes communications requirements
anticipated in the near future. These future requirements are derived from expected
technological advancements. The major assumptions for this study are listed below:
• The data rate for basic voice quality is 2.4 kbps; high quality voice is 4.8 kbps.
• Netted voice is high quality.
• The following data rates generally apply for data and video communications: Low
data rate (LDR) < 9.6 kbps, medium data rate 1 (MDR1) = 64 kbps, medium data
rate 2 (MDR2) = 256 kbps or 512 kbps, and high data rate (HDR) = 2.048 Mbps.
• The Naval Computer and Telecommunications Master Station (NCTAMS)
functions as the interface between Joint and/or Navy shore commanders and Naval
forces afloat for all MDR and HDR requirements. LDR voice and data
communications between afloat forces and commanders ashore can be direct (i.e.,
bypass the NCTAMS).
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The NCTAMS functions as the hub for hub-spoke circuits and extends these
circuits to regional, continental United States, and global users.
Broadcast service consists of discrete links (e.g., Fleet Broadcast) and information
that can be consolidated on the global broadcast service channels such as imagery,
weather data, and Armed Forces Radio and Television.
The Fleet Broadcast is highly protected; all other broadcast service requires low
or no protection.
When Naval forces are outside the GBS high throughput spot beam, those
broadcast circuits that are normally consolidated onto a single GBS channel
become discrete broadcasts. [Ref. 4:p. 9]
2. Assumptions for Emerging Marine Corps Requirements
The Marine Corps makes up one halfof the Naval team. The Marine Corps relies on
Navy amphibious ships to execute their mission. ARG units play an important role in modern
naval operations and, as can be seen in Forward...From the Sea, they will continue to do so
for years to come. Amphibious units provide tremendous flexibility to national planners by
their inherent ability to strike at almost any coastal location. The Marine Corps brings then-
own set of emerging requirements to the loading analysis. As with the emerging Naval
requirements, Marine Corps requirements from the FRD were translated into suitable format
for the loading analysis. The major requirements used for the analysis are listed below.
Marine Corps ERDB requirements apply only when Commander Marine Forces
(COMARFOR), Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) and Marine Expeditionary
Units (MEU) are deployed as ground forces in the theater of operations. The
Navy satisfies information requirements for COMARFOR, MEF and MEU while
aboard ships.
The data rate for basic voice quality is 2.4 kbps; for high quality voice it is 4.8
kbps, with the exception ofthe Defense Switched Network (DSN) and the Defense
Red Switched Network (DRSN) which are 64 kbps.
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• Netted voice, DSN, DRSN, and voice channels that accompany video service are
high quality. Other voice services are a mixture of high quality and basic quality.
• The following data rates generally apply for data and video communications: Low
data rate < 9.6 kbps, MDR1 = 64 kbps, MDR2 = 256 kbps or 5 12 kbps, and HDR
= 2.048 Mbps.
• Broadcast service consists of discrete links (e.g., Tactical Information Broadcast
System) and information that can be consolidated on GBS channels such as
imagery and weather data. The GBS spot beams will be available to the
COMARFOR, MEF and MEU deployed in a theater of operations.
• Broadcast services for COMARFOR, MEF and MEU require low or no
protection.
• Hub-spoke connectivity within the Marine Corps' ERDB requirements set applies
to ground mobile forces (GMF) circuits.
• COMARFOR and MEF video teleconference (VTC) requirements are included in
the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) and telemedicine requirements
are included in the MEF combat service support element N-Level Internet Protocol
Router Network (NIPRNET). [Ref. 4:p. 10]
3. Architecture Payload Design Assumptions
With the exception of the UHF F/O spacecraft, all satellites included in the analysis
are conceptual models. As such, certain assumptions were made concerning the satellite
payload design and employment. The basis for the assumed designs was the proposed
architecture developed by the Office ofthe DoD Space Architect. This section will outline
the assumptions made for each class of satellite.
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a. UHF F/0 Payload
A |
1 FLTBDCST Channel
25 kHz Channel x17





Figure 4.1. UHF Payload Configuration. [Ref. 4:p. 17]
The UHF F/0 constellation for the 2008 architecture will have four pairs of
satellites in geosynchronous orbits. Each of the pairs will be separated by 90°. These
satellites will provide global coverage up to seventy degrees North and South latitude. Figure
4. 1 provides an illustration ofthe payload configuration on a UHF F/O spacecraft. The UHF
communication subsystems will consist of several 25 kHz and 5 kHz channels. Signals are
received and amplified at the satellite, then transmitted back to terrestrial users. The
spacecraft will also have the capability of receiving certain SHF uplinks. "The SHF
communications subsystem receives broadband-jamming-protected uplink signals ofthe Fleet
Broadcast channel; up to three Fleet Broadcast channels can be multiplexed for simultaneous
reception." [Ref. 24 :p. 296]
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The majority of the UHF F/O spacecraft have an EHF LDR payload. "Only
the UHF payload is considered in this loading study because the Advanced EHF (A/EHF)
satellites, the follow-on to the MILSTAR satellites, are capable of handling all EHF
requirements." [Ref. 4:p. 17] It is important to realize, however, that this study only loads a
percentage of the actual military requirements. Army and Air Force requirements are
neglected while Naval requirements have been loaded. This is in keeping with the purpose
of the study.
The Navy currently employs UHF communications primarily to support mobile
users. Voice services can be provided at data rates between 2.4 and 9.6 kbps. This meets the
voice requirements specified in the ERDB, but does little to satisfy other high data rate
requirements. UHF terminals are currently in use throughout the fleet. They are light weight
and inexpensive which makes them ideal for mobile units.
b. SHF/Ka PayloadAssumptions
The SHF constellation consists of five spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit.
The Ka designation refers to the GBS payload which is to be built into the satellite. Figure
4.2 provides an illustration of the assumed configuration for the spacecraft payload. The
stationing ofthe satellites will be such that each ocean area, with the exception ofthe Pacific,
will have one satellite providing coverage. The Pacific area will have two spacecraft stationed
above it.
"The SHF/Ka payload design includes four 2.2° SHF antennae, frequency
reuse, and a radio frequency (RF) switch allowing uplinks from one beam to be routed on the
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downlink to another beam." [Ref. 4:p. 18] Specifically the SHF system will provide medium
to high data rate transmissions to its users. Shipboard capabilities are limited by the size of
the receive antenna. Larger platforms such as carriers and command ships will have larger
terminals which will support higher bandwidth transmissions.
SHF PACKAGE
1 degree spot beam x4
17.5 degree EC beam
Ka PACKAGE
1 Degree Spot Beam x4
1.5 Degree Spot Beam x2
3 Degree Spot Beam x2
17.5 Degree EC Beam
Figure 4.2. Assumed SHF/Ka Payload Configuration. [Ref. 4:p. 18]
c EHF Payload Assumptions
The EHF constellation will consist of four MILSTAR and nine UHF F/0
spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit. As mentioned earlier, the UHF F/O spacecraft will not
be considered during the EHF loading. All ofthe MILSTAR spacecraft will be equipped with
both the Advanced EHF LDR and MDR payloads.
Figure 4.3 provides an illustration of the anticipated MILSTAR EHF payload
configuration. The LDR payload has one Earth coverage receive horn, one Earth coverage
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transmit horn, two narrow spot beam transmit/receive antennas, one wide spot beam
transmit/receive antenna, five electronically steered agile receive antennas, and one agile
transmit antenna. TheMDR payload hosts a suite of eight steerable spot beam antennas. Two
of these are narrow spot beams (NSB) and the remaining six are distributed user coverage
antennas (DUCA). The NSBs have an onboard nulling capability which significantly increases
the jam resistance ofthe MDR system. [Ref 4:p. 19]
2 Beams per Phased Array
3 Arrays per Satellite
Channel spacing used on
beams.
B.
Figure 4.3. Assumed MILSTAREHF Payload Configuration. [Ref. 4:p. 20]
SCENARIO FORCE STRUCTURE
The force structure for this analysis has briefly been discussed in previous chapters.
A limited sample of the force structure used for this loading is located at the end of the
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chapter in Table 4.2. It is important to note that forces deployed in LRCs might not consist
ofboth a CVBG and an ARG. Forces are deployed where and when they are needed. One
example of this is LRC4 in Table 4.2. This LRC is supported only by ARG units. This
situation can be considered analogous to recent operations in Somalia where only amphibious
forces were used to support forces ashore.
It is also important to recap the constituents of different battle groups. We will begin
with the CVBG. The CVBG is centered around the carrier. There are also numerous support
ships to aid and screen the aircraft carrier. These ships include cruisers, destroyers, frigates,
submarines and other support vessels. Associated air wings and staff units are included with
the ships for the loading. All SATCOM capabilities which are normally associated with a
CVBG at sea are included in the scenario.
The ARG is the second formation of ships and forces which is discussed. An ARG
is centered around a large deck amphibious assault ship, usually an LHA or LHD. In addition
to the assault ship, there are two LSDs and an LPD in the group. Once again, traffic here
is meant to represent the normal amount ofSATCOM traffic associated with an ARG which
is operating under normal deployment conditions.
There are ten CVBGs and ten ARGs loaded into the scenario. Some of the groups
are in port in the United States. Other units are conducting workups in U.S. coastal waters.
Still other groups are in transit to and from deployment areas such as the Mediterranean Sea
and the Persian Gulf. The remainder or the forces are deployed and operating in normal
areas. The scenario analyzes the traffic generated by each of the units in their various
locations while conducting daily operations. This enables the correlation ofSATCOM traffic
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levels to unit locations and the operations performed.
The force structure for the loading analysis is built up unit by unit.[Ref. 4:p. 13] The
ERDB identifies the numbers and types of circuits required for each platform. As the
communication suit for each unit is created, they are then summed into the remainder of the
battle group they are associated with. This allows an in-depth look at the traffic loading
which will then identify the circuits or systems carrying the majority of the communications
load. The loading also considers the relative distance between platforms in the analysis. "By
using the relative distance approach, the CVBG object can be associated with any location
and the units associated with the object take on the same location without having to make
individual assignments to each of them." [Ref. 4:p. 13]
C. STUDY METHODOLOGY
This purpose of this section is to explain the methodology that was used while
conducting the system loading. It will cover such issues as transponded versus processed
signals and DAMA usage. In addition to this, it will also investigate the configuration of each
of the different classes of satellites for the purpose of the loading analysis.
1. Transponded Versus Processed Satellite Transmission
The analysis was required to distinguish between transponded and processed signals.
Transponders are simply active microwave repeaters which are carried on most of the
communications satellites. These instruments are well understood and proven technologically
which means that a transponding satellite can generally be expected to cost less than a
processing satellite. Processing satellites have computers onboard which modify or process
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the up-linked signal. Processing satellites are able to realize a signal gain through their
processing capabilities and therefore enhance signal quality. They also provide other
advantages in terms of digital transmissions and anti-jam capabilities. The negative aspects
of onboard signal processing is that the added computer increases the weight and the
complexity ofthe satellite. This infers that the processing satellite will cost considerably more
than its transponding cousin.
For the purposes of this analysis, certain assumptions were made with respect to
transponding and processing satellites.
The study considers the UHF and SHF/Ka payloads to be transponding systems and
the A/EHF payload to be a processing system. With transponding systems the loading of a
link is dependent upon the bandwidth demand on the transponder. To determine the exact
loading on a transponding satellite requires that all requirements for platforms in that satellites
footprint be evaluated. The number and bandwidth of all channels required are calculated and
then subtracted from the available capacity of that satellite. This is not true of processing
systems. Processing satellites have the same resource requirements for a link regardless of
the loading of other traffic on the payload; therefore, this study is able to load each conflict
individually and sum the results. [Ref. 4: p. 27]
2. UHF With DAMA Loading Methodology
"The UHF loading is the most simplistic of the study in that it assumes the link can
be made given the terminal is in the footprint of the satellite and capacity is available." [Ref.
4:p. 28] When a conflict between terminals for capacity arose, the loading fell back on a
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priority based system. The highest priority in the loading was given to CVBG units. The next
highest priority for access went to ARG units. Third priority was designated for Marine
Corps terminals, and this was followed by all remaining requirements. [Ref 4:p. 28]
DAMA is Demand Assigned Multiple Access. It was originally created as a means
of reducing congestion on FLTSAT assets. DAMA is a system which provides a means of
performing Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) on various channels in multiple formats. The
major advantage inDAMA is that it allows multiple transmissions on the same channel instead
of one transmission per channel. This increases the efficiency of the system tremendously.
[Ref. 24:p. 280]
The technical specifications for the UHF loadings are listed below:
Each satellite uses four frequency plans, two per footprint. In each footprint there are
four broadcast channels, thirty-four 25 kHz channels and forty-two 5 kHz channels. Of these
channels, 75% use DAMA (i.e., twenty-six of the 25 kHz channels per footprint and thirty-
two ofthe 5 kHz channels per footprint). A 25 kHz automatic control DAMA channel with
15 frame formats can support four 2.4 kHz voice/data networks or three 2.4 kHz voice/data
networks and one 4.8 kHz voice/dama network. Service greater than 4.8 kHz requires a
dedicated channel. A 5 kHz automatic control DAMA channel supports Navy requirements
up to 2.4 kHz voice/data networks. [Ref. 4:p. 28]
The NavyDAMA network varies depending upon the situation and requirements of
the forces being supported. Baseband equipment input/output can be 75 bps, 300 bps, 600
bps, 1 .2 kbps, 2.4 kbps, 4.8 kbps and 16 kbps. The Navy DAMA network multiplexes several
baseband subsystems on one 25 kHz transponder channel using a time division multiple
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access (TDMA) system. DAMA network control stations are normally the NCTAMS, but
any platform with full duplex capability can be designated a DAMA controller channel. [Ref.
4:p. 28]
3. SHF/Ka (GBS) Loading Methodology
Several assumptions were made for the SHF/Ka (GBS) loading. "The combined
SHF/Ka payload design provides for a radio frequency (RF) switch that allows uplinks from
one beam to be routed on the downlink to another beam." [Ref. 4:p. 29] The SHF/Ka loading
considers both the duplex communications ofthe SHF platform and the broadcast capabilities
ofthe Ka (GBS) transponder. Only spot beams were considered for the loading analysis. The
lack ofa transponder switch to an earth coverage (EC) antenna negated the wide area beam.
This means that all SHF communications were conducted by employing the system 2.2° spot
beam. No EC beams were used in the loading. Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying (QPSK) was
the modulation chosen for the analysis. [Ref. 4:p. 29]
The technical specifications ofthe SHF/Ka loadings are discussed below.
The initial step in loading the SHF/Ka is to perform a baseline calculation to determine
the percentage of satellite power and bandwidth required for 1000 bps. This percentage can
be scaled to any data rate. The scalability ofthe results is important. It allows the evaluation
of higher bandwidth signals by simply applying a simple scaling factor. Table 4. 1 shows the
results ofthe simplified calculation of transponder power and bandwidth use. The results of
the table constitute the scaling factors which are applicable to all transmission. These results
show, in the bandwidth percentage cell, that any 1 kbps service in the scenario requires
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0.0018% ofthe transponder bandwidth. Note that in Table 4. 1, two instances appear to be
power limited rather than bandwidth limited. Both the EC to EC and Spot to EC for the 7
foot receiver are power limited. This is evident because more power is used for each
transmission than bandwidth. The study assumes that in this scenario all terminals with a 7
foot antenna in the carrier battle group are covered by spot beams and not EC beams.
Because there is thus no requirement for a terminal to receive in the EC beam, the power
limitation is not an issue. [Ref. 4:p. 29]
Receiver EC to
EC
EC to Spot Spot to EC Spot to Spot




















Table 4. 1 . Transponder Power and Bandwidl hUse. After [Ref. 4:p. 29]
4. EHF Loading Methodology
There are four EHF satellites in the proposed architecture. Each of these satellites is
separated by 90° to ensure world wide coverage. "Beams are positioned to cover Naval
forces participating in the four LRCs, the MRC and background operations." [Ref. 4: p. 30]
Efforts were made throughout the loading to ensure minimum beam usage in all situations.
One example in the MRC is the use ofa 5° spot beam to cover all Naval units involved rather
than multiple smaller spot beams to cover each battle group. The assumption is made that
shore terminals, which are outside the spot beam, are covered by the Earth Coverage beam,
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and a l°spot beam is used to cover a battle group underway in open ocean steaming. [Ref.
4:p. 30]
Technical aspects of the EHF loading are listed below:
The number ofuplink channels and downlink hops used per payload are determined
based on link budget calculations. The MELSTAR Interface Control Drawing, SI-1 135 and
SI-2035, contain tables that map required carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N) to modulation mode.
The least robust modulation mode a terminal type can support in each satellite beam is
determined by calculating the C/N for the uplink and downlink of each terminal type in each
satellite beam type. The number ofhops for each service is calculated given the modulation
mode for each service participant, the number of satellite beams used in the service, the
required data rate, and connectivity. [Ref. 4:p. 31]
The total number ofuplink and downlink hops per satellite is determined by summing
the hops for each service on the satellite. Uplink hops are totaled and divided by the number
of hops in an uplink channel to determine the number of uplink channels. In addition, the
uplink hop calculation is tracked on a service participant basis to determine the total number
of uplink hops used by each terminal. The calculation makes the following assumptions:
• C/N associated with the 1+8*DPSK mode is an assumed value based on the other
DPSK modes corresponding C/N values.
• Performance ofQPSK modes is equal to twice the performance ofDPSK modes
(e.g., C/ required for 16+320 QPSK = 2 x C/N required for 16+320 DPSK).
• Use the unstressed data rate with and without jamming to facilitate analysis and
comparison.
• A contiguous set ofuplink accesses are always available, assuming the number of
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accesses could be provided. [Ref. 4:p. 31]
85
MRC LRC1 LRC2 LRC3 LRC4
CVBG1 CVBG2 CVBG3 CVBG4 CVBG5 CVBG6 CVBG7 CVBG(N/A)
CV1 CV2 CV3 CV4 CV5 CV6 CV7
CG1 CG3 CG5 CG7 CG9 CG11 CG13
CG2 CG4 CG6 CG8 CG10 CG12 CG14
DD1 DD3 DD4 DD6 DD7 DD9 DD10
DD1 DDG2 DD5 DDG5 DD8 DDG8 DD11
DDG1 DDG3 DDG4 DDG6 DDG7 DDG9 DDG10
FFG1 FFG4 FFG7 FFG10 FFG13 FFG16 FFG19
FFG2 FFG5 FFG8 FFG11 FFG14 FFG17 FFG20
FFG3 FFG6 FFG9 FFG12 FFG15 FFG18 FFG21
SSN1 SSN4 SSN7 SSN10 SSN13 SSN16 SSN19
SSN2 SSN5 SSN8 SSN11 SSN14 SSN17 SSN20
SSN3 SSN6 SSN9 SSN12 SSN15 SSN18 SSN21
AOE1 A0R1 A0E2 A0R2 A0E3 A0R3 A0E4
ATS1 AD/AS1 ARS1 ASR1 ASR2 ARS2 ATS3
UAV1 UAV3 UAV5 UAV7 UAV9 UAV11 UAV13
UAV2 UAV4 UAV6 UAV8 UAV10 UAV12 UAV14
CVAIR1 CVAIR2 CVAIR3 CVAIR4 CVAIR5 CVAIR6 CVAIR7
ARG1 ARG2 ARG3 ARG4 ARG5 ARG4
LHA1 LHD1 LHA2 LHD2 LHD3 LHA3
LPD1 LPD2 LPD3 LPD4 LPD5 LPD4
LSD1 LSD2 LSD3 LSD4 LSD5 LSD4
FFG31 FFG32 FFG33 FFG34 FFG36 FFG35
DDG16 DD17 DDG18 DD19 DD21 DD20
UAV21 UAV23 UAV25 UAV27 UAV31 UAV29
UAV22 UAV24 UAV26 UAV28 UAV32 UAV30
AAIR1 AAIR2 AAIR3 AAIR4 AAIR5 AAIR4
LCAC1 LCAC10 LCAC19 LCAC28 LCAC46 LCAC37
LCAC2 LCAC11 LCAC20 LCAC29 LCAC47 LCAC38
LCAC3 LCAC12 LCAC21 LCAC30 LCAC48 LCAC39
LCAC4 LCAC13 LCAC22 LCAC31 LCAC49 LCAC40
LCAC5 LCAC14 LCAC23 LCAC32 LCAC50 LCAC41
LCAC6 LCAC15 LCAC24 LCAC33 LCAC51 LCAC42
LCAC7 LCAC16 LCAC25 LCAC34 LCAC52 LCAC43
LCAC8 LCAC17 LCAC26 LCAC35 LCAC53 LCAC44
LCAC9 LCAC18 LCAC27 LCAC36 LCAC54 LCAC45
AAV1 AAV7 AAV13 AAV19 AAV31 AAV25
AAV2 AAV8 AAV14 AAV20 AAV32 AAV26
AAV3 AAV9 AAV15 AAV21 AAV33 AAV27
AAV4 AAV10 AAV16 AAV22 AAV34 AAV28
AAV5 AAV11 AAV17 AAV23 AAV35 AAV29
AAV6 AAV12 AAV18 AAV24 AAV36 AAV30
MCM1 MCM2 MCM3 MCM4
MHC1 MHC2 MHC3 MHC4
Table 4.2. A Sample ofLoading Force Structure. After [Ref. 4:p. 12]
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V. MILSATCOM LOADING ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A. LOADING ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the results of the Booz-Allen and Hamilton loading analysis.
[Ref. 4] It begins with a description of analysis tools used to conduct the study. Next, it
discusses the scenario build up and findings associated with each stage. Force structures for
each stage ofthe build up will also be explained. This provides insight to areas of high force
concentration for each ofthe scenario stages. At the end of each stage, loading requirements
for each of the SATCOM regimes will be provided. Loading of each of the different types
of satellites makes it easier to identify shortfall areas ofMILSATCOM capabilities.
1. Loading Tools
Loading for this analysis was conducted using a variety of software loading tools.
Microsoft Excel proved to be the primary software package used throughout the study. Excel
proved to be both efficient and flexible as a loading tool. It is compatible with the ERDB
which is also in Excel format. The Personal Computer Satellite Orbit Analysis Program (PC
SOAP) was used to model satellite orbits and determine which satellites would provide
service to a particular geographical region. A Beta version of a loading tool known as
WTNSAT was tested for this study. This tool, while very promising, proved too immature
for the depth of this analysis. [Ref. 4:p. 27]
87
B. LOADING SCENARIO BUILD UP
The loading was performed in three distinct phases. This section of the thesis v .1
examine each stage of the loading as a distinct segment. Attention will be focused on force
distribution, military activity and satellite resources required to support operations.
1. Stage 1 Loading Results
"Stage 1 of the loading analysis examines the resources required for supporting
background operations plus two LRCs, the Persian Gulf with a JTF commander embarked
and Bosnia." [Ref 4:p. 35] Figure 5.1 provides the loadings required to support the above-
mentioned operations. The loading displayed in this figure represent the total capacity
required for the entire MILSATCOM system and not any particular satellite. The following
sections will identify the capacity required from each satellite in each ofthe specific classes.






UHF SHF Ka(GBS) EHF
Figure 5.1. Stage 1 Naval Loading Percentages. After [Ref. 4:p. 36]
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a. UHF Loading Performance
Figure 5.2 provides a summary of the UHF performance on a satellite by
satellite basis. Each satellite has one broadcast channel. The satellites which provide
coverage to the continental U.S. had taskings for both broadcast channels. Eight channels
were required to fill all required tasks. This is 400% of the total channel capacity. Two
requirements were filled and left 6 requirements unsatisfied. The two satellites providing
coverage to the Indian Ocean were able to cover all requirements with 1.5 broadcast channels.
This correlates to 75% utilization. There were no communications requirements identified
for the Atlantic and Pacific supporting satellites. [Ref. 4:p. 37]
Each UHF F/O satellite is equipped with seventeen, 25-kHz channels. Thus,
two satellite coverage provides 34 such channels to each area of coverage. There was a
147% demand for 25-kHz channels on CONUS spacecraft. "Stage 1 uses all 34 on the
CONUS satellites with sixteen network requirements left unsatisfied." [Ref. 4:p. 37] The
satellites supporting the Atlantic footprint experienced a 29.4% utilization of their 25-kHz
capacity while the Indian Ocean satellites experienced 70.6% of these same channels. The
Pacific satellites 25-kHz channels were idle during this portion of the loading.
UHF F/O satellites have 21, 5-kHz channels. This infers that there are 42
channels available in each area of service. Only the CONUS spacecraft experienced any usage
of these channels. Their total loading of 5-kHz channels was 14.3%.
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Stage 1 UHF Satellite Performance
CONUS LANT
Broadcast utilization %
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Figure 5.2. Stage 1 UHF Satellite Performance. After [Ref. 4:p. 36]
b. SHFLoading Performance
Figure 5.3 provides a summary of SHF satellite performance on a satellite by
satellite basis. This proposed constellation of SHF satellites is able to meet all requirements.
All units are covered by utilizing 2 of 3 spot beams on the Conus, Atlantic and Indian Ocean
satellites. Only spot beams were used to provide service to all assets in each region. As
stated in Chapter IV, EC beams were not employed in this loading. One ofthe two spacecraft
over the Pacific is able to meet all requirements in that region with only one beam. The
remaining IO spacecraft is idle.
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2.2 deg. spot %
IO PAC-1 PAC-2
2.2 deg. Spot %
2.2 deg. sp 87 12 16 52
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2.2 deg. Sp 87 39 15
Figure 5.3. Stage 1 SHF Satellite Performance. After [Ref. 4:p. 37]
c. jfiTa (GBS) Loading Performance
The GBS payloads provided ample service for all currently defined
requirements. "Regardless of scenario, there were few requirements in the draft FY 96
ERDB for the use ofGBS "[Ref 4:p. 39] Fleet wide implementation ofGBS capabilities will
burgeon future requirements for this systems. As afloat commanders come to realize the
potential inherent to this system, they will demand greater access and additional services.
d. A/EHF Loading Performance
As previously mentioned, EHF loading was completed by utilizing MILSTAR
spacecraft only. Figure 5.4 provides the loading requirements for each individual satellite.
Only minimal loadings were experienced on these spacecraft. The highest percentage loading
was for the Indian Ocean satellite which operated at 54% of its downlink capacity. The next
91
highest loaded spacecraft was the one supporting CONUS. It operated at 18% of its
downlink capacity.







U/L BEAMS D/L RESOURCE
U/L BEAMS 28 17 33 17
D/L RESOURC 18 14 54 8
Figure 5.4. Stage 1 EHF Satellite Performance. After [Ref. 4:p. 40]
2. Stage 2 Loading Results
Stage 2 examines the satellite capabilities required by the force structure used to
support the two LRCs examined in Stage 1, plus the additional capabilities required to
support the Korea/China MRC. Figure 5.5 provides the overall loadings required to support
all Stage 2 scenario operations. Additional subsections will examine each individual satellite
genre and discuss specific satellite loadings.
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Stage 2 Loading Percentages
100
UHF SHF Ka(GBS) EHF
Figure 5.5. Stage 2 Naval Loading Percentages. After [Ref. 4:p. 40]
a. Stage 2 UHFLoading Performance
The introduction ofan MRC to the existing scenario dramatically increases the
usage ofUHF assets. There is a 200% demand for broadcast channels and a 285% demand
for 25-kHz service on PAC assets. "The MRC uses all of the PAC satellites and leaves two
broadcast nets and sixty-three 25-kHz nets unsatisfied."[Ref. 4:p. 42] The IO spacecraft
experienced a 25% increase in broadcast demand. All other UHF asset loadings were
unaffected by the addition of the China/Korea MRC. Figure 5.6 provides the loadings for
individual spacecraft.
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Broadcast% 100 100 100
25 kHz% 100 29 4 70.6 100
5 kHz% 14.3 100
No. Chan. Req' 22 SS
Figure 5.6. Stage 2 UHF Satellite Performance. After [Ref. 4:p. 42]
b. Stage 2 SHFLoading Performance
SHF spacecraft were able to support all communication requirements
throughout Stage 2. Figure 5.7 illustrates the loadings ofthe SHF constellation spacecraft.
The addition of an MRC in the Pacific area of operations creates a significant increase in the
bandwidth demand for supporting assets. There was a combined increase of 76.5% in
demand placed on these satellites. An additional spot beam was added to cover all
requirements. "Although the 2.2° spot beam 1 is used nearly to capacity on both the PAC
satellites, the SHF constellation remains robust despite the severe stress of the scenario."[Ref
4:p. 42]
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Stage 2 SHF Spot Beam Percent
CONUS LANT IO PAC-1 PAC-2
2.2 deg. Spot % H 2.2 deg. Spot %
2.2 deg. Sp 87 12 16 95 90.5
2.2 deg. Sp 87 39 15 67.8
Figure 5.7. Stage 2 SHF Satellite Performance. After [Ref. 4:p. 42]
c iStoi^e 2 Ka (GBS) Loading Performance
The addition ofan MRC increases the 0.5% GBS loading in Stage 1 to 1.4%
in stage 2. "The real potential of this two-way wideband system is not fully realized in this
scenario. The GBS requirements are covered by three beams using a 3.5 transponder." [Ref.
4:p. 434]
il Stage 2 A/EHFLoading Performance
The 4 MTT.STAR spacecraft are able to support all Naval EHF requirements
in this scenario. "Despite the considerable stress added by the cumulative scenario
requirements, the A/EHF capability remains robust without jamming during Stage 2." [Ref.







Stage 2 EHF Loading Percent
CONUS LANT IO PAC
U/L BEAMS D/L RESOURCE
U/L BEAMS 28 17 1 17
D/L RESOURC 18 14 62 8
Figure 5.8. Stage 2 EHF Satellite Performance. After [Ref. 4:p. 44]
e. Stage 2 A/EHF Loading Performance with Jamming
MLLSTAR spacecraft are touted as being resistant to jamming. A nuisance
jammer was added in the MRC to analyze the performance ofthe A/EHF system in a jamming
environment. So far as the analysis tools were able to determine, the jammer had little effect
on the operation of the A/EHF system. Figure 5.9 illustrates the loadings placed on each
spacecraft throughout the scenario.
Introduction ofa wideband nuisancejammer in the MRC theater requires more
resources than Figure 5.9 implies. Analysis reveals that there are specific instances were the
jamming was effective, on platforms if not the spacecraft. Note that the Indian Ocean
spacecraft appears to use fewer resources with jamming than without jamming. This is
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because twelve submarines were unable to be included in 21 of the EHF networks. Since
they are unable to close the link it appears that the jamming frees resources. [Ref. 4:p. 44]







U/L BEAMS D/L RESOURCE
U/L BEAMS 2S 17 33 17|
D/L RESOURC 18 14 54 8
1
Figure 5.9. Stage 2 EHF Satellite Performance with Jamming. After [Ref. 4:p. 45]
3. Stage 3 Loading Results
Stage 3 adds two additional LRCs to the scenario described in Stage 2. "The loading
study examines the resources required for supporting a LRC in the Falkland Islands with a
Joint Task Force Commander embarked, and a LRC in Somalia." [Ref. 4:p. 45] Figure 5.10
provides the loadings required to support scenario operations. Figure 5.10 still appears, at
first glance, to be very encouraging. When considering the illustration scaling and lack of
other loaded requirements, the results are not so encouraging. The UHF segment of the
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architecture constitutes 60% of the total system capacity. This is only Naval requirements.
Later sections will identify the detailed loadings for each genre of satellite.











SHF Ka (GBS) EHF
Figure 5.10. Stage 3 Loading Percentages. After [Ref. 4:p. 45]
a. Stage 3 UHF Loading Performance
The scenario in Stage 3 proved to be too extensive for the UHF constellation.
"The UHF constellation is over subscribed in stage 3."[Ref. 4:p. 46] Figure 5.11 describes
the total load placed on the system by the scenario. Broadcast requirements are for 200% of
system capacity. There is a 168% demand for 25-kHz channels in this scenario. The system
can support a maximum of 136, 25-kHz channels. 85 requirements for these channels were
unsatisfied by the proposed architecture. The Pacific satellites also experienced 100%
utilization of 5-kHz channels. 5-kHz channels were the least utilized of any UHF channel
throughout the loading. 115 of these circuits went idle throughout the loading .
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Broadcast% 100 50 100 100
25 kHz% 100 100 100 100
5 kHz% 14.3 11.9 100
No. Chan. Req' 22 3 3 65
Figure 5.11. Stage 3 UHF Satellite Performance. After [Ref. 4:p. 47]
b. Stage 3 SHFLoading Performance
Figure 5.12 illustrates the SHF constellation loadings during the Stage 3
scenario. An additional Atlantic spot beam was utilized to provide coverage for the
Falklands. The Indian Ocean spacecraft also used an additional spot beam to support
operations in Somalia. The constellation fulfilled all Naval requirements throughout all three
stages of the loading.
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§| 2.2 deg. Spot %
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2.2 deg. Spot %
2.2 deg. Sp 87 12 '6 95 90.5
2.2 deg Sp 87 92 !5 67.8
2.2 deg. Sp 67.8 30.1 27.3]
Figure 5.12. Stage 3 SHF Satellite Performance. After [Ref. 4:p. 47]
c. Stage 5 JTa (GBS) Loading Performance
The Global Broadcast System remained underutilized throughout the scenario
buildup. Stage 3 loading required only 1.84% of total system capacity.
d. Stage 3 A/EHFLoading Performance with Jamming
Stage 3 loading considered only the situation with an operational nuisance
jammer. Figure 5.13 describes the loadings on each ofthe MILSTAR satellites. "Figure 5.13
also illustrates an increase of nearly double the resources used on the CONUS EHF satellite
during the Falkland Islands LRC." [Ref. 4:p. 48] The A/EHF constellation fulfilled all Naval
requirements throughout all ges of the loading scenario.
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U/L BEAMS 33 22 33 17
D/L RESOURC 30 18 54 8
Figure 5.13. Stage 3 EHF Satellite Performance with Jamming. After [Ref. 4:p. 49]
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. LOADING CRITIQUE
The Booz-Allen & Hamilton (BAH) loading analysis provides a basic metric for
identifying shortfalls associated with the proposed MTLSATCOM architecture. This is of
great interest to the U.S. Navy when considering the importance this architecture will play
in future Naval operations. The study is, however, limited in that it only considers Naval
requirements and current military tactics.
1. Total Requirements
As previously stated in Chapter V, Naval requirements constitute only a small
percentage of the overall MTLSATCOM communication requirements. The ERDB formed
the basis for the loading. It is the tool by which the Navy predicts future requirements for
both the Navy and Marine corps. It does not address future requirements or growth rates of
other services or government agencies. The study, by not specifically addressing these issues,
cannot make any predictions as to the percentage of capacity which will be demanded by each
ofthe entities in the future. It is possible that one or more of the other entities dependent on
the architecture, such as the Army or Air Force, could have a greater growth in requirements
than the Navy. This would lead to that service's assigned bandwidth percentage out-weighing
that allotted to the Navy. Considering the conduct of the loading analysis, it will provide no
indication of an impending traffic overload situation. By limiting the study to Naval
requirements, the loading analysis results provide only a crude estimation as to areas of
bandwidth capacity shortfall and the extent to which the SATCOM system will be
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oversubscribed.
2. Revolution in Military Tactics
There is an ongoing revolution in tactics employed by the U.S. armed forces. The
development of new tactics and force employment methods has been fueled by growth in
information technology. This technology is an enabler which allows smaller, more mobile
forces to overcome numerically superior forces. Information technology has been a key in
the development ofnew 'smart weapons' and more capable command and control systems.
The BAH study did not examine the impact new tactics and weapons systems would have on
the MTLSATCOM architecture. It predicted future usage requirements based on
extrapolation of current force structure and tactics. This MILSATCOM architecture is to be
implemented in the year 2008. At that date, the U.S. military will operate under a different
force structure and tactics than envisioned in the BAH study, which will have a marked effect
on predicted SATCOM requirements. The remainder of this section will identify emerging
tactics and systems which might alter the requirements used as a baseline for the
MILSATCOM loading analysis.
a. Revolution in Naval Surface Fire Support
Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) is the means by which the surface navy
supports and enables Marine Corps assault and maneuver in the littoral environment. Current
shipboard gun systems are range limited to 13 nautical miles.fRef. 25 :p. 26] This range is well
within the limits ofterrestrial line-of-sight communications systems. Gun system research is
fast changing this. The new 5-inch/62-caliber gun will be introduced into the fleet in the year
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2000. This gun will have a maximum range of approximately 70 nautical miles. The Vertical
Gun for Advanced Ships (VGAS) is expected to be fielded in 2010. This is a vertically fired,
rocket assisted 155 mm gun system capable ofa maximum range of 100 nautical miles. Both
of these systems will support maneuver far in excess of line-of-sight communications. [Ref.
25 :p. 27] This increased fire support range will demand SATCOM resources for spotting and
call for fire functions. Ground forces will require over- the-horizon links with fire support
ships for fire adjustment and safety calls. This development, which was not considered by the
study, will produce new requirements which must be fulfilled by the supporting
MILSATCOM architecture.
b. Tactical Aircraft SATCOM
Both the Navy and Air Force have stated a goal of placing voice SATCOM
systems on future fighter aircraft. The Air Force intends to place EHF communications
systems aboard its tactical aircraft. The Navy intends to use UHF SATCOM for its fighter
links. The Joint Strike Fighter, scheduled for introduction in the early part of the next
century, will be the first U.S. tactical aircraft initially designed with a voice SATCOM system.
All ofthese developments were neglected in the loading analysis. UHF and EHF SATCOM
systems in Navy and Air Force aircraft will create a need for many channels. Based on the
UHF loading results, it would appear that Navy tactical aircraft, with UHF SATCOM, alone
could overload the system in one geographical region. [Ref. 26]
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c. Coalition Warfare
Warfare in the future will be fought by coalitions. Operation Desert Storm
was one example ofa coalition of military forces acting in concert to achieve a common goal.
The escalating cost ofmodern warfare will necessitate this type of cost and risk sharing in the
future. The threat of fratricide requires that all coalition partners have effective
communications with each other. U.S. forces, in the past, have provided its partners with
some SATCOM capabilities to limit the possibility of 'blue-on-blue' engagements. The Booz-
Allen study did not incorporate this scenario into their analysis. Sharing bandwidth with
partners is necessary and proper, but limits the bandwidth available to U.S. users.
d\ Marine Corps Hunter Warrior Concept
The Marine Corps is investigating new tactics to capitalize on information
systems. One ofthese tactical concepts is the Hunter-Warrior concept. This is a break from
traditional Marine tactics. Normally Marines fight on a company level. The Hunter-Warrior
concept has small groups ofMarines operating over vast areas of land to harass and interdict
the enemy. Normally groups would consist of 3 or 4 Marines. They rely on information
superiority and maneuver to ensure their effectiveness and survival. Although HF skywave
and meteor burst systems can provide beyond-line-of-sight communications, they are inferior
to SATCOM systems in terms of providing Hunter-Warrior teams with secure, timely,
compact communications at sufficient data rates. This will create a large demand for
SATCOM access. It was not addressed in the Booz-Allen study and could have a profound
effect on overall Naval communication requirements. [Ref. 27:p. 12]
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B. RESEARCH ANALYSIS
Three fundamental questions regarding the MILSATCOM architecture were identified
in Chapter One of this document. Deficiencies have been noted with the scope of the loading
analysis. Focus throughout the conduct of this research has been concentrated on developing
answers for these questions within the defined scope. Findings and conclusions reached as
a result of the research performed are expressed in the remainder of this section.
1. Question One
Does the MILSATCOM architecture meet Naval communications requirements as
defined in the ICDB and the ERDB?
Stage 1 loading results provide the answer to this question. The CONUS spacecraft
of the UHF constellation were oversubscribed when the system was loaded for normal
background operations and two LRCs. As the loadings increased in complexity, more
shortfalls in the total capacity of the architecture became apparent. As a result, it is logical
to assert that specific segments of the proposed MILSATCOM architecture do not meet all
Naval requirements.
2. Question Two
What are the specific system shortfalls if the architecture does not meet all defined
requirements?
There were requirements shortfalls identified throughout each stage of the loading
analysis. Not all shortfalls identified, however, were associated with each class of satellite.
At least one class of satellite had no significant shortfalls noted. For this reason, findings of
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system shortfalls will be listed by satellite class.
a. UHF Loading Findings
UHF satellites demonstrated the most acute limitations of all systems analyzed
throughout the loading. UHF assets were not capable of satisfying 100% of Naval
requirements in any ofthe test scenarios. It is important also to restate that the loadings did
not consider any requirements from other services or government agencies. With only a
fraction ofthe actual operational requirements loaded, the system was heavily oversubscribed.
This realization provides a framework to better understand the extreme limitations associated
with this segment ofthe architecture.
UHF communications have proven to be the backbone ofNaval SATCOM for
the past several decades. Shortcomings in this band could have a dramatic impact on mobile
users throughout the Naval service. 25-kHz circuits are identified by the loading as the most
heavily impacted ofthe UHF channels. The loading identified 85 UHF 25-kHz requirements
that were unfulfilled. [Ref. 4:p. 45] The proposed 8-satellite constellation ofUHF spacecraft
does not provide the communications capacity necessary to support Naval users in the
operational environment of the future.
b. SHFLoading Findings
The SHF constellation met all Naval requirements in each of the loading
stages. Stage 3 loadings placed the greatest stress on the SHF constellation. Naval
requirements for this stage constituted approximately 40% ofthe total system capacity. [Ref.
4:p. 45] It is important to note, again, that the loading analysis neglected other service or
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government agency SHF requirements. It is unrealistic to believe all other U.S. requirements
will be satisfied by the remaining 60% of the system capacity. In real-world situations it is
conceivable that some Naval requirements would go unfulfilled due to higher level
requirements from other user segments. Augmentation for SHF capabilities might be required
to satisfy 100% of future requirements.
c. Ka (GBS) Loading Findings
The GBS segment ofthe architecture met all Naval requirements throughout
each stage ofthe loading. Stage 3 ofthe loading placed the greatest amount of stress on the
system. With one MRC and four LRCs included in the scenario, maximum system usage was
1.84%.[Ref. 4:p. 45] One reason for the minimal usage on the GBS system is that "there
were few requirements in the draft FY 96 ERDB for use of the GBS."[Ref. 4:p. 39]
d A/EHF Loading Findings
The A/EHF MILSTAR constellation fulfilled all Naval requirements
throughout the loading analysis. System usage during Stage 3 only reached 27% of total
system capacity. [Ref. 4:p.45] The loading also omitted the EHF packages aboard UHF
spacecraft. Considering the total capacity of the MELSTAR system and the buffer capacity
carried aboard UHF spacecraft, it appears that the EHF constellation is fully capable of
meeting its future requirements. The system will still require periodic monitoring to prevent




Once shortfalls have been identified, what can be done tofulfill them?
This research has considered both proven and emerging technologies which have
potential to provide augmentation for systems with requirements shortfalls. This section
identifies specific system alternatives and identifies the shortfalls which they are to address.
a. DAMA Implementation
The implementation ofDAMA in UHF networks increases system efficiency
by allowing greater numbers ofusers to access the same circuit. Introduction ofDAMA will
satisfy a greater number of requirements than the standard duplex communication systems.
b. Re-evaluation of Voice Data Rate Requirements
All voice requirements in the 1996 ERDB are greater than 2.4 kbps.[Ref. 4:p.
50] This is a result of a trend in modern communication systems which strives for greater
voice quality. A communication paradigm which is relevant to this situation is that digital
transmissions providing greater voice clarity also require more bandwidth. Field commanders
have identified a need for voice recognition. Many of the command and control functions in
modern warfare are carried out by voice circuits on the battle field. Commanders feel that a
better understanding of a specific situation may be attained by being able to hear 'how'
combatants say something and not just 'what' they say.[Ref 19:p. 4-38]
The U.S. military has operated successfully for years with 2.4 kbps voice
networks. It is understandable that commanders would desire voice recognition on certain
circuits. This capability would provide them with more insight to an operational situation.
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The question is however: Do all voice networks require 4.8 kbps or greater data rates? Some
ofthe newly emerging commercial SATCOM systems such as IRIDIUM and GLOBALSTAR
offer voice services at 2.4 kbps.[Ref. 28:p. 1] If these new systems are able to compete for
market share in the competitive Personal Communication System (PCS) market, then surely
there are some military networks which could operate effectively at 2.4 kbps. More 25-kHz
circuits would be available for other network requirements if non-vital networks were
migrated to 2.4 kbps circuits.
c. Commercial Satellite Service Providers
Commercial satellite service providers are capable of augmenting point-to-
point communications required by the proposed architecture. Emerging mobile satellite
providers have concentrated their development efforts on the point-to-point PCS markets.
This augmentation could ease some ofthe overloading on UHF satellites by diverting some
voice requirements. Generally, commercial providers do not offer the netted services which
could augment netted circuit requirements identified in the ERDB.[Ref. 28:p. 1]
The IRIDIUM system is one example of a large commercial PCS system which
is capable of fulfilling some Naval MTLSATCOM requirements. The constellation consists
of66 satellites in LEO. The inclination ofthe orbital planes provides the system with world-
wide coverage. This aspect of the system satisfies Naval requirements for polar coverage
which are left unfulfilled by the DoD-owned GEO systems.
Limitations associated with IRIDIUM are similar to those of other commercial
systems. Primarily, the government does not own the system and, therefore, does not control
111
it. Service could be cut offby the service provider. Survivability of the system is also an
issue. Military systems are designed to be robust and have a long operational life.
Commercial systems are engineered for shorter life spans which allow providers to upgrade
system technology and remain competitive in their market. This philosophy works well in the
commercial arena, but has definite limitations in military applications. Since they are not as
robustly engineered as the military spacecraft, commercial spacecraft become more vulnerable
to exploitation or attack by an adversary. Industry will tolerate minor coverage gaps while
replacing a damaged satellite, but this gap in coverage might prove crucial to military users.
The capacity of IRIDIUM is the most significant limitation of the system.
Each satellite has an 1,100 channel capacity. These channels are distributed among 48 spot
beams. This configuration provides approximately 30 channels to each footprint. A typical
spot beam will have a diameter of 600 km.[Ref. 28 :p. 1] The system will employ Time
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) for access in each footprint. It also uses Frequency
Division Multiple Access (FDMA) to enhance system performance by allowing frequency
reuse between spot beams.[Ref. 29:p. 1] Since there are few channels (approximately 30)
available in any footprint, military users might be forced to compete with commercial users
for access to the system. An adversary could overload the system with a ft w commercially
available handsets. In times of high traffic, military users alone could cause an overload on
the system.
The loading analysis identified 111 point-to-point requirements which could
be satisfied by commercial mobile service providers. Migrating some of the less critical
requirements to commercial systems would open more 25-kHz channels to operational
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users. [Ref. 4:p. 50]
d. Consideration ofEHF
The A/EHF constellation met all requirements during the loading. In fact, the
MILSTAR system was not heavily loaded, and the surge capacity of the UHF packages was
not even considered. Consideration should be given to migrating some UHF network
requirements to EHF. Each UHF satellite EHF package is equipped with 3 broadcast and 7
uplink communication channels. [Ref. 5:p. 4-66] Some ofthe required circuits could be loaded
on the UHF satellite EHF package. This would reduce the loading on the UHF circuits and
not significantly impact the loading on MILSTAR spacecraft.
e. GBS Applications
As noted on the SHF loadings, there are some requirements which were filled
in this loading but would probably go unfulfilled in real-world situations. SHF systems are
primarily used for wideband services. The GBS system was designed to provide a one-way
wideband broadcast of information to deployed units. Some less critical SHF requirements
might be transitioned to the GBS system. This would reduce Naval loadings on the system
and allow more usage of GBS assets. Users could apply the 'user pull' concept, in which
existing narrowband communications channels are employed to request wideband information
via the GBS system. There are already requirements for narrowband channels which could
provide the conduit for users to request non-sensitive wideband data via Global Broadcast
dissemination. This could also serve as a boon to such emerging concepts as tele-medicine
and conference calling. The video transmission would have to be one way, but it would
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provide the service without impacting other systems.
f. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are a non-space based alternative to a
regional communication overload. A squadron ofUAVs equipped with communications relay
packages can serve as an augmentation to satellite assets in a specific theater. They can
operate for extended periods of time and do not require a pilot onboard for operation. A
pilotless vehicle eliminates the threat of a downed airman in hostile territory. It also increases
the availability of the system by terminating crew rest and other such requirements. A
squadron ofUAVs could operate around the clock and be outfitted with the communications
package for which there is the greatest demand. This package could be changed while
rotating UAVs are on-station in order to meet changing communication requirements in the
region.
One limitation to the utility ofUAVs is that they possess a small footprint.
Some are capable of conducting operations at 50,000 feet. This sounds high but in reality
it is very low when compared to a LEO satellite operating at an altitude of 1,000 km. The
lower altitude of a UAV infers that it will have a much smaller footprint than a spacecraft
operating on the same frequency. With a smaller footprint, UAVs would be forced to operate
closer to front line units, and thus become a viable target for an adversary. Special
consideration would have to be given to air defense in offering protection for these assets.
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g. Aerostats
Aerostats or 'blimps' are being developed as a means of providing commercial
mobile communication services to a specific geographic area. These craft are unmanned and
will maintain an altitude of 20 to 30 km. This will enable each craft to provide service
throughout a 900 km diameter footprint. SKY STATION will be one of the first aerostat
firms to provide service. The company plans to begin operations in 1998. They advertise an
operational life of 10 years per aerostat. Each aerostat will be equipped with a proprietary
navigation and control system. The 'blimp' will maintain its position above the earth through
the use of its navigation system and will not be tethered to the ground. Once on station, the
craft will provide service to both mobile and fixed user sites within its footprint. Mobile
services will be provided at data rates between 64 kbps and 2.048 Mbps. Terminal size is the
determining factor for mobile user data rates. A 5-foot dish is required for 2.048 Mbps
transmissions. Fixed users will receive higher data rates. SKY STATION advertises a 155
Mbps data rate to fixed sites. [Ref. 30:p. 1]
The military could benefit by leasing or developing its own such program.
This system would provide a large communications augmentation capability in a regional
conflict. It could be utilized, like the UAVs, to supplement any system which is overloaded.
SKY STATION has not released any firm cost estimates, but projects usage fees will
approximate the cost of a standard long distance phone call. Difficulties associated with this
system might involve interoperability with existing terminals. Safety of flight is an issue which




One concept which may aid in reducing the wideband loading on DSCS
spacecraft is a Navy developmental project. It is called Challenge Athena. This project leases
transponders from commercial providers in order to afford the fleet with more wideband
capacity. INTELSAT is the company which is currently being utilized. This system uses the
commercial transponder to provide 1.544 Mbps duplex communications to its users.
Challenge Athena was not loaded into the scenario because it is not a military-owned system.
This concept has the potential to significantly reduce the loading on wideband spacecraft by
providing an alternative means of transmission for non-sensitive data.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
By evaluating the solutions to the research questions and analysis shortfalls contained
in this thesis, it is possible to identify certain topics which warrant future study. The
remainder of this section covers possible topics for future thesis research.
1. Realistic Loading Analysis
Study ofthe constraints used in the conduct ofthe loading analysis indicates shortfalls
in the analysis results. Limiting the study to Naval-only requirements, and the assumed use
of current force structure and tactics, produced only tentative results. A full loading analysis
which considers emerging tactics in concert with currently defined emerging requirements




Several alternatives for loading shortfalls identified re-evaluation of stated
requirements as a key to fulfilling Naval requirements. Future studies should focus on specific
shortfalls identified in the loading analysis.
a. Narrowband Requirements
Narrowband requirements in the ERDB should be individually re-evaluated.
Specific attention should be paid to bandwidth required, protection, coverage, topology and
quality. Once these attributes have been isolated, a determination can be made as to whether
or not the requirement was properly defined. Improper requirements should be redefined to
better capture the need expressed by users, as compared to services available. Options for
redefinition should include: realistic data rate, migration to EHF, migration to a commercial
provider, and non-space based alternatives.
b. Wideband Requirements
Wideband requirements should be individually re-evaluated. Again,
characteristics such as data rate, quality, coverage, topology and protection should be
considered. Once this has been completed, the study should perform an analysis to identify
requirements which could be better fulfilled by other means. Options for redefinition should
include, but are not limited to, a migration to GBS, commercial providers, and non-space
based systems.
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3. Non-Space Based Augmentation of Satellite Capacity
Newly emerging technology is providing non-space based communications systems
which are capable of providing augmentation for existing satellite systems during regional
crises. The use ofUAVs and other systems such as SKY STATION should form the basis
for the study. The investigation should be conducted to determine the feasibility of these
systems as an augmentation capability. Total capacity and services provided by each system
should be examined. Cost benefit analysis of services available should be addressed.
Logistics associated with each system should be identified. Timeliness and ease of relocation
for each system should be addressed. SKY STATION is designed to maintain station on a
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